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PREFACE
Chapter one introduces the topic and outlines chapters two, three, four and five.
Chapter two discusses environmental ethics in the light of the three notions of the
environment,namely, instrumental value, intrinsic value and the inherent worth. This
chapter also discusses philosophical theories of ethics, viz. a consequence-based theory,
which is, Utilitarianism, principle-based theories and a philosophical principle of
stewardship.
Chapter three discusses the trajectory of sustainable development with respect to selected
international events. This chapter also shows how the paradigm of sustainable
development has peen embraced in nation states, with a special reference to South Africa.
Chapter four critically analyses South Africa's environmental law and its macro-
economic policy, GEAR, in the light of environmental ethics.
Chapter five synthesises discussions raised in the'preceding chapters and offers some
, insights as to how policy-making pertaining to environment and development can be
improved by incorporating a holistic approach of environmental ethics.
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CHAPTER ONE
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
1.0 Introduction
The enormous environmental degradation that accompanied development prior to 1980s
led to significant attempts to reverse the "past" trends of development. In an attempt to
reverse this phenomenon, new forms of development have since been sought. Efforts
have been made such that environmental concerns are taken into consideration in
development processes. Laws and policies related to development procedures, which are
meant to inhibit environmentally unfriendly behaviour, have been established. This is as
the result of the insight that undergirds what has become widely known as sustainable
development. This chapter outlines issues that follow in chapters two, three, four, five
and six.
1.2 Outline of chapters
Chapter two provides a conceptual framework within which environmental ethics in this
thesis is discussed. This will include discussing three notions of environmental values,
viz. instrumental value, intrinsic value and inherent worth. The reason for discussing
these notions is in line with the argument that it is the first two dimensions that form the
core of conservation policies. With respect to this, it is the utility of the environment (in
that humans regard the environment as of use to them, be it in terms of consumption of
resources or aesthetic purposes hence of intrinsic value) that conservation policies tend to
safeguard. If not all, most conservation laws in modem thought are devoid of the
recognition of the inherent worth of the environment. As it will be argued in a greater
detail in chapter four, understanding the environment in terms of its instrumental value
and hence utilitarian, has not only resulted in humanity's truncated view of the
environment, but has also rendered attempts to protect and manage the environment less
successful. To this effect, environmental law purports to reflect and cushion human
interests rather than environmental interests per se.
In relation to the above, two ethical theories and a moral principle, namely,
Utilitarianism, deontology and stewardship, will be discussed in chapter two. In its
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Benthamite classical version, Utilitarianism as a philosophical theory alludes to the need
to seek "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (Goodin 1995:3), and hence it is
consequence-based. Unlike Utilitarianism, Deontology is non-consequentialist in that it
justifies moral behaviour based on certain pre-established rules. Stewardship, as a moral
principle, whether in a negative sense or positive sense, basically points to the idea that
humans are lords over nature. Some examples from South Africa's environmental
legislation and a macro-economic policy that embody value-judgements that underlie the
above philosophical traditions will be cited.
The significance of discussing the above principles and notions of the environment is
informed by the contention that different environmental laws or principles and economic
policies either explicitly or implicitly embody various elements of the ethical theories and
principles. Another claim in this thesis is that, in certain cases, it would be difficult to
categorically define the purpose of particular environment/development law or policy in
the light of a particular philosophical tradition or moral principle. Hence, granted that
there are diverse values and ideologies that underlie our contemporary valuation of the
environment, the aim of engaging various approaches to environmental ethics in this
study is to umavel "environmental problems in all their complexity, and ... challenge us
to escape the limitations of an uncritical ethical perspective" (Des Jardins 1993:15). In
relation to this, the insight informing this approach is that, within such a broader purview,
environmental ethics "describes the varied ways in which different people understand the
world (the different levels of "environmental consciousness")" (ibid). For example, some
people subscribe to Utilitarian principles while others uphold duty/rights (deontological)
approaches to the environment. Basically, the same can be said of environmental laws
and development policies. It is within this broad framework that the significance of
environmental ethics vis-a-vis environment/development-related laws/policies in South
Africa will be discussed. However, the implications of these ethical theories will be
discussed in detail in chapter four.
The mam aIm of chapter three is to discuss how the trajectory of sustainable
development, following the realisation that previous trends of development would
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jeopardise needs for present as well as future generations, led to the need for rethinking
human activities or development processes in relation to the environment. This new form
of "environmental consciousness" presupposed that development processes could not be
divorced from the environment in that the former depends on the latter and hence the
latter dictates the extent to which the former can happen. Selected international events
and structures that are deemed as to have contributed significantly to sustainable
development paradigm will be discussed.
Chapter three also discusses how South Africa, in the wake of adopting a democratic
form of governance, has adopted environmental legislation that alludes to the concept of
sustainable development. Uncritically looking at fundamental values entrenched in the
Bill of Rights (chapter two) of the 1996 South Africa's Constitution, it could be argued
that post-apartheid South Africa, as part of a "global village", embraces the core ideals of
sustainable development. In other words, the 1996 South African Constitution seems to
be an examplar of the Brundtland Report. One of the pronounced features in the 1996
South African Constitution is the centrality of human rights in chapter two. For example,
within a broader framework of human rights, section 24 of the Bill of Rights foregrounds
and stipulates people's right to a healthy environment as a facet of human rights.
Chapter four critically analyses various environment/development-related provisions and
policies of South Africa. It can be argued that it is the recognition and endorsement of the
concept of sustainable development that gave rise to principles such as the "Polluter
Pays" Principle (PPP), the Precautionary Principle (PP) and "Duty of Care" (DoC)
provided for in South Africa's environmental legislation. There is a correlation between
such principles and sustainable development. For example, the "Polluter Pays" Principle
(PPP) serves as an incentive to humanity to subscribe to sustainable development. In this
regard, environmental laws are put into place to inculcate a particular form of morality
that is intended to promote the ideals of a society with respect to the environment. Palmer
observes: "environmental law rests on popularly held values concerning the ways III
which humans should act in their natural and living environments" (1997: 113).
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While environmental laws and provisions are significant for regulating human behaviour
towards the environment, as already mentioned above, environmental laws and economic
policies are meant to promote human well-being as opposed to protecting the
environment for its own sake. In other words, environmental laws and development-
related policies necessarily tend to safeguard and enhance human values and interests
while the non-human values are largely sidelined. This is precisely because our
"environmental consciousness" and subsequently, environmental laws and policies are
impregnated with anthropocentricism whereby, as Seed says, humans are "the crown of
creation, the source of all value, the measure of all things" (1985:243-6). Consequently,
as Taylor observes, our moral concerns and interests for non-human species are "in every
case based on the contingent fact that our treatment of those ecosystems and communities
of life can further the realization of human values and/or human rights" (2000:96). This is
an inherent deficiency in environmental laws and economic policies such that this has
negative effects on the promotion and achievement of the core ideals of sustainable
development.
Having indicated that there are constraints concomitant in South Africa's environmental
legislation and provisions, hence, the question that underlies this research is: to what
extent can environmental ethics, which is an indispensable and invaluable tool for the
holistic understanding of the environment, obviate the deficiencies in South Africa's
environmental law and, thereby, reinforce the core ideals of sustainability? The
hypothesis to this question is: South Africa's environmental law and provisions need to
be informed by ecocentric ethics if the core ideals of sustainability are to be enforced.
The central argument is that unless humanity's perception of the environment transcends
the human utility of the environment, and embraces an all-encompassing ecocentric
approach, no significant protection of the environment will be achieved. This implies
that, subsequently, environmental laws have to be tailored in such a manner that an
ecocentric dimension is equally taken into cognisance. This perception fmds expression
in the concepts of intrinsic value, in the philosophical sense and not in the legal
orientation, and inherent worth of the (natural) environment, as it will be discussed in
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detail in chapter five. In the light of this, I will seek recourse to the ecological models
such as the Gaia theory/Land ethic, Ecofeminism, and Deep Ecology.
These ecological theories presupposes that the environment should be protected not
simply because of its utilitarian purpose to humanity but, essentially, because of its
intrinsic value and inherent worth. This is the insight that undergirds an ecocentric theory
of environmental ethics which presupposes that utilitarian and deontological ethical
theories and other moral principles be informed by the inclusive insight into creation,
thereby, promoting a symbiotic culture through which inherent worth of all life forms and
non-life forms of the environment are respected and promoted. Having said this does not
mean precluding human utility of non-life systems, however, as Taylor says, the aim is to
"maintain a healthy existence in a natural state" (2000:96). This further implies that,
while fulfilling human needs and promoting human rights, this should be done within the
purview of what Taylor calls "ultimate moral attitude" towards non-human species (ibid).
While the principle of equal consideration of interest, presumed on the notion of
"ultimate moral attitude", "does not allow major interests to be sacrificed for minor
interests" (Singer 1993:63), it however, challenges the idea that human species are
superior to non-human species. In the light of the above insights, chapter five provides a
critique of environmental law with a special reference to South Africa's environmental
legislation and economic policies, in particular, the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR).
1.3 Obj ectives of the Study
Specific objectives of the study are:
• To discuss and analyse theories of ethics that can provide a conceptual framework for
critically re-examining South Africa's environmental policies.
• To explain how environmental ethics can promote a holistic understanding of the
environment and the law.
• To document and understand the principles and provisions of environmental laws as
mechanisms that regulate environmental management in the quest for sustainable
development.
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1.4 Significance of the Study
Considering its previous history, probably more than any other country in the world,
South Africa faces a formidable challenge of redressing past ills. The Constitution could
be regarded as an instrument that is meant to address various ill factors and institutions
that tended to undermine morally acceptable values. In 1996, the South African
government came up with new legislation in an attempt to address various challenges.
One such challenge is the need for addressing econorruc disparities amongst South
Africans that spilled over from the apartheid legacy. In the course of this overall process,
there is a potential tension between the need to meet the economic needs of the people
(instrumental aspect), which might result in environmental degradation, and protecting
the environment (intrinsic value and inherent dimension of the environment). Boff
outlines the dilemma in such a situation: "[w]hen development and environmental
conservation are in tension, development is usually chosen and the cost paid in
environmental deterioration" (1997: 5).
While this study would by no means attempt to disregard the values embodied in South
Africa's environmental legislation, however, this study attempts to chart a way forward
by suggesting a conceptual framework that can be incorporated into South Africa's
environmental law. This will be done by drawing on ecological models of ethics so as to
"understand and evaluate the moral codes woven into cultures - what they are and how
they function to enhance or distort the relationships of human beings to one another and
to the Earth" (Engel 1990:6 italic original).
In discussing the significance of ecocentric ethics vis-a-vis the environment, this study
provides, by unraveling constraints in South Africa's Bill of Rights and environmental
legislation, a critical tool that can be utilised in policy making pertaining to
environment/development-related issues. In other words, the discussions that will emerge
from this study might be of importance by applying them in public spheres where
environmental laws are formulated, and hence, contributing to engendering an edifying
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paradigm whereby the environment in its complexity would be respected. Subsequently,
one of the objectives of this study is to promote sustainability not only in ecological
terms, but also in terms of "transformation of present societal structures, systems, and
practices so as to render them sustainable in their own right" (Rasmussen 1996:139). This
thesis recognises that there is an ever-increasing debate about the versatility of the
concept of sustainable development. While it is recognised that there is a potential
conflict between meeting human needs, on the one hand, and environmental concerns, on
the other hand, the objective here is mainly to unpack philosophical justifications that
have greatly influenced policy issues.
However, realising that the topic is wide, and considering the scope of this thesis, only
selected legislations associated with the concept of sustainable development and deemed
to be relevant to this study, will be discussed. The aim is essentially to uncover basic
utilitarian implications of South Africa's environmental law and its related policies. The
main objective of this chapter is not to challenge the integrity of the law but to offer a
more complementary approach that ethics (in general) could offer. To achieve this,
recourse will be sought to insights emanating from "green" schools of thought such as the
Gaia hypothesis/land ethic, Ecoferninism and Deep Ecology to highlight a holistic
approach to environmental ethics.
It is of significance to mention that the main focus of this thesis is environmental ethics
rather than environmental law. As already indicated above, while ethics provides some
philosophical justifications as to what people ought to do, law is a tool for implementing
such justifications. However, the emphasis of this thesis is on how the moral framework
of the relationship between humans and nature, embodied in environmental legislation, is
environmentally constrained and unsound. It is compelling that a more environmentally
friendly paradigm should be sought.
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CHAPTER TWO
ENVIRONMENTAL ETillCS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
It seems unthinkable for humanity not to have a particular way of relating significance of
different entities to their world-views. Every aspect of human life is marked with a
dimension of values. It can be argued that different values act as pillars on which varied
human life systems rest. Some people will regard the environment as being of value
because of its utility to them; either for its consumption or aesthetic purposes. However,
some people recognise the inherent worth of the environment. This notion points to the
value of the environment that goes beyond its utility, and is hence, independent of its
human use. In chapter four, it will be argued that various efforts directed towards
safeguarding the environment have not borne significant improvements because
environment/development-related policies embody utilitarian-oriented values of the
environment rather than the inherent worth of the environment. In this thesis, the
"Utilitarian" (capitalised) implies the philosophy (as it will be defined below) while
utilitarian· or utility (lowercased) means the particular function the environment serves
humanity. The latter notion is closely associated with the instrumental value of the
environment.
This chapter discusses three notions of environmental values, viz. instrumental value,
intrinsic value and inherent worth. This thesis contends that it is the first two concepts of
the environment that form the core of conservation policies. With respect to this, it is the
utility of the environment (in that humans regard the environment as of use to them, be it
in terms of consumption of resources or aesthetic purposes) that conservation policies
tend to safeguard. If not all, most conservation laws in modern thought are devoid of the
inherent worth. The orientation of environmental law is based on the human utility of the
environment and it is hence anthropocentric. An anthropocentric approach to
environmental ethics is reflected in economic policies whose main aim is to "maximize
the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people". As already mentioned in
chapter one, this chapter discusses three categories of moral philosophical traditions
which presuppose particular moral obligations humans have towards the environment.
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Examples of environmental principles and provisions that reflect respective philosophical
theories will be discussed.
2.2 Valuation of the environment and environmental ethics
Values underpin and cannot be divorced from our socio-political and econOlTIlC
in~titutions. They are functional in human endeavours and structures. Fekete outlines the
centrality of values to human life:
Not to put too fine a point on it, we live, breathe, and excrete values. No aspect of
human life is unrelated to values, valuations and validations. Value orientations
and value relations saturate our experiences and life practices from the smallest
established microstructures of feeling, thought and behaviour to the largest
established macrostructures of organisations and institution (1998:4).
In this regard, it can be said that human structures are permeated with varied values. In
many respects, moral codes that are embraced in various institutions are informed by
particular values. The same can be said of institutions that deal with
development/environment-related processes and projects. In fact, one area in life where
the discourse of values has become extremely significant and contestable is that of
environment. For example, on a personal level, an individual could be a vegetarian
because s/he believes in animal rights. At a micro level, a group of individuals could
protest against the construction of a road that would disrupt an ecosystem because it
believes in the integrity of the ecosystem. In the latter case, the reasoning could be either
that the aesthetic beauty will be destroyed or that this would undermine the inherent
worth of individual entities in the ecosystem. On a macro level, international "green"
organisations such as Earth First! will lobby people at the international level to boycott
buying products that do not have ISO 1500 (which can simply be understood as an
environmentally friendly certification), the reason being that the production process
involved is environmentally unfriendly.
In a nutshell, the notion of environmental values is compatible with environmental ethics
in the sense that values give insight into:
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value systems ... about 'proper conduct' of life in general and about ways of
interpreting specific events in terms of more extensive commitments to particular
social arrangements and political orders. They indicate the cultural plurality - and
often ambiguity - within which notions of 'rightness' and 'wrongness' are
formulated, maintained, contested and changed (O'Brien and Guerrier 1995:xiv).
Thus, it can be said that institutions and structural processes embody value-judgements
that tend to justify reasons why humans must or must not act in a particular way vis-a-vis
the environment. It follows then that particular institutions/structures in society tend to
promote and protect particular environmental values -by regulating people's behaviour
towards the environment. In sum, value-judgements inherent in moral philosophical
traditions shape our actions whether individual or collective (O'Brien and Guerrier
1995:xiiv).
2.2.1 Instrumental value
The notion of instrumental value of the environment is associated with an anthropocentric
version (bias) of human utility of the environment. It implies that humanity appreciates
the environment for its instrumental end or purpose. Thus, "[i]nstrumental value is a
function of usefulness. An object with instrumental value possesses that value essentially
because it can be used [by humanity] to attain something else of value" (Des Jardins
1993: 144). Different entities of the environment are valued for the sake of their varied
use to human beings. As Connelly and Smith say, "[w]e attribute instrumental value
whenever we regard the non-human world as valuable in so far as it is of use to human
beings" (Connelly and Smith 1999: 18). Hence, human valuation is central to this value-
concept; "the excluded sphere is appropriately treated as a means to ends of the higher
sphere of group, [such that] its value lies in its usefulness to the privileged group, that is,
in contrast, worthwhile or significant in itself' (Plumwood 1994: 155).
In other words, people have regard for particular aspects of the environment solely for the
reason that they satisfy human needs. Consequently, "human action in maintaining any
aspect of the natural world is made contingent upon the interests people happen to have
(or think they have)" (ibid.). In this regard, an environmental entity would not possess
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instrumental value independently of human agency. It is only when human beings reckon
the utility of the environment that the question of instrumental value becomes intelligible.
As a result, people will be motivated to conserve the environment essentially because it is
regarded as a resource that is perceived as instrumental to gratifying their own needs and
not necessarily because the environment is. From a modem economy perspective, what is
imperative behind conserving the environment is the sustainability of environmental
resources in order to maintain the well-being of humanity not the well-being of the
environment per se. It is clear that it is the instrumental value of the environment that is
imperative rather than its integrity.
It is the awareness that the environment is indispensable for sustaining human livelihood,
for example, within and across generations, that the environment is accorded value. It is
this value for human welfare that determines moral obligation on the part of humanity
towards the environment. In a negative sense, this further implies that in the absence of
its instrumental value, the environment would not command moral obligation on the part
of humanity. For instance, a particular society would perceive value of a plant species
because it bears edible fruit or provides timber or because its parts are used as herbal
medicine, and any plant that does not serve functions such as these is, on this account,
without value.
2.2.2 Intrinsic value
Opposed to appreciating the environment merely in terms of human utility, though
equally anthropocentric, is the notion of intrinsic value. According to Des Jardins, "[a]n
object has intrinsic value when it is valued for itself and not simply valued for its uses"
(1993:144). This notion is compatible with Taylor's notion of what he calls inherent
value: "the value we place on an object or a place... that we believe should be preserved,
not because of its usefulness or its commercial value, but simply because it has beauty, or
historical importance, or cultural significance" (1986:73). To this effect, the value of
objects with symbolic importance is applicable only in the sense that they are valued
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because of their noncommercial importance, and independently of any practical use to
which they could be put (Taylor 1986:74).
Even though the intrinsic value of the environment in its original sense seems to be more
enlightened than the instrumental value, however, its plausibility for a holistic
environmental ethic is questionable in terms of environmental law. This is because, as
Connelly and Smith seem to suggest, the notion of intrinsic value is applicable when
humanity values any aspect of the natural world for its spiritual and aesthetic virtues
(1999: 19; see also Des lardins 1993). Related to this, is the understanding that people
who would ascribe intrinsic value to a particular aspect of the natural world would avoid
any action that would spoil its aesthetic beauty. In other words, such people are merely
spectators rather than, say, "consumers" (ibid.). In the light of this, it can be argued that,
just as in the case of instrumental valuation where human subjects attribute a value to the
environment as a result of its practical usefulness, equally, the notion of intrinsic value is
dependent on human agents. An object will have intrinsic value only when an individual
attaches a particular significance to it.
Thus, it is the human interests that a policy tends to protect. It is out of the human awe for
particular species of the environment that people would in turn be willing to protect them.
For example, a wilderness could be preserved because of the ecological "completeness" it
offers to a particular neighbourhood. In this regard, the intent of an environmental
legislation pertaining to the wilderness conservation is to protect it because people
appreciate its ecological beauty. It is this symbolic aesthetic significance (value) that, in
the same vein, regulatory mechanisms tend to protect wildernesses so as to serve human
satisfaction. In this sense, it becomes morally justifiable to consider the conservation of a
wilderness for the sake of other human beings who would equally appreciate the beauty
of nature. The philosophy behind environmental law and provisions is that people have to
conserve species of aesthetic significance so as not to deprive fellow humans of the same
opportunity of experiencing the beauty of nature. Hence, it is not necessarily particular
aspects of nature that are protected but, ideally, human interests.
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2.2.3 Inherent worth
As opposed to both notions of instrumental and intrinsic values (which depend on human
valuation), a profound notion to understand entities of the environment is that of inherent
worth. According to Des Jardins, "[a]n object has inherent worth if it is good (or has a
good) in itself, independently of any human valuing" (1993:146). In other words, an
aspect of the environment does not attain its value because of its utility, as is the case
with instrumental and intrinsic notions respectively, but essentially because it is an end in
itself and hence, is non-instrumental and subsequently in that sense, not anthropocentric.
The notion of inherent worth is conventionally anchored in the understanding that
humans possess inherent human dignity and respect, hence independent of human
valuing. Humans enjoy inherent worth essentially because they "possess not only a
noninstrumental value, but also a special kind of worth or dignity in and of themselves"
(Des Jardins 1993: 146)(italics original). Subsequently, this leads to the moral justification
that people must be treated as "ends and never simply as means, or as subjects and never
simply as objects (cited in Des Jardins 1993:34)(italics original).
Arguably, the notion of human rights is a legal expression of the recognition of inherent
worth attributed to humans. Philosophically, inherent worth provides a moral justification
whereby human dignity and integrity are supposed to be protected and promoted. It is
human dignity and integrity that thus provide a moral ground that humans be treated as
ends in themselves not as means. In this way, the deontological ethic (human rights to a
healthy environment) presupposed in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution
alludes to Kant's view of the "categorical imperative", and that arises from the
fundamental ethical duty, that is, "act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person
or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (2000: 189).
However, a holistic perspective of environmental ethics presupposes a moral extension of
the concept of inherent worth to non-human entities. In other words, the concept of
inherent worth requires humans to have moral concern and care for nature as well. David
Erenfeld advocates for the preservation of species and their habitats necessarily because
"they exist and because this existence is itself but the present expression of a continuing
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historic process of immense antiquity and majesty. Long-standing existence in Nature
carries with it the unimpeachable right to continual existence" (cited in O'Riordan
2000:120). Having suggested that Erenfeld's insight is edifying in terms of environmental
ethics, however, I am aware that the above quotation has a problem of being an
expression of what G. E. Moore would call the naturalistic fallacy (see Singer 1993:426).
According to Erenfeld, the fact that something has long existence (or "is") means that it
"ought" to be preserved. There is a serious philosophical argument as to whether or not
one can derive an "ought" claim from an "is" claim. This is not necessarily the case in
real life situations. To give one crude example, it would not be morally justifiable to
preserve murder just because it has been there since humanity.
This notion of inherent worth forms a basis for biocentric or life-centred ethics. The
perception that non-human species equally have inherent worth has far-reaching
implications for the relationship between humans and the environment in its entirety. It is
the philosophy of the inclusive well-being of nature encapsulated in the notion of
inherent worth that the concept of sustainable development, though fallible, seeks to
embrace. In principle, as a value-judgement concept, sustainable development at least
presupposes concern for the environment. Hence, by and large, one of the contentions of
this thesis is that values attributed to the environment tend to provide moral justifications
for managing the environment. This purpose is subsumed in environmental laws.
2.3 Environmental ethics
According to Palmer, environmental ethics is "the study of how humans should or ought
to interact with the environment" (1997:6). The intent of environmental ethics is to
morally evaluate human actions in relation to the environment. The core task of
environmental ethics is to distinguish environmentally friendly behaviour from behaviour
or processes that have negative effects on the environment. Thus, from a development
perspective, environmental ethics presupposes a form of development that "protects the
ecological basis of life [as} the most fundamental element in an ethically defensible
concept of ... the good life" (Wells 1996: 11 )(italics original). Therefore, the focus of
environmental ethics in this thesis entails discussing and analysing selected traditional
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ethical theories that have influenced and permeated contemporary thinking and structures
in terms of environmental issues. The aim is to "understand and evaluate the moral codes
woven into cultures - what they are and how they function to enhance or distort the
relationships of human beings to one another and to the Earth" (Engel 1990:6)(italics
original).
Having affIrmed that environmental ethics entails a relationship of interaction between
people and the environment (in a holistic sense of the word), it follows then that the
assumption is that perceived values of the environment inform the way people interact
with the environment. Varied ethical theories embody values which a particular culture
associates with the environment, and hence seeks to protect and promote. In other words,
instrumental and intrinsic values are incarnate in various traditional philosophical
theories. The core values associated with the environment permeate environmentally
philosophical thinking which, whether consciously or subconsciously, in turn, provides a
framework against which value-judgements are judged in response to environment-
related questions or issues. In other words, value-judgements that underlie different
philosophical theories regarding the environment have important implications for how
people interact with the environment and hence, environmental ethics.
In this regard, the same can be said about the paradigm of sustainable development. As a
philosophical ideology, the concept of sustainable development epitomizes the ideals that
are meant to provide a framework against which human activity pertaining to
development as a whole is perceived and appraised. In the context of South Africa's
Constitution, it could be said that the Bill of Rights represents a particular "value system"
through which values of the environment are entrenched, and hence it alludes to the
concept of sustainable development. The Bill of Rights as a manifestation of a "value
system" endorsed in South Africa's Constitution prescribes what is legal or illegal
behaviour, reinforcing ideals of sustainable development. But regulation of humanity's
behaviour is both a legal and ethical matter; it operates under the premise that, in general
terms, regulating people's behaviour vis-a-vis the environment will ultimately serve the
purpose of promoting and protecting particular values which South Africa's society seeks
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to achieve. In other words, by putting into place, conservation policies, for example, the
ideal of meeting people's needs within and across generations will be met. In the same
vein, by encouraging environmentally friendly behaviour through principles such as the
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), it is presumed that, in general terms, the integrity of the
environment (and of its constituent species, for example, humans' health) will be
safeguarded. These are some of the value-oriented rationales that are embodied in moral
philosophical traditions discussed below.
2.3.1 Theories of Ethics
2.3.1.1 Consequence - based theory - Utilitarianism
According to consequence based theories, an action is right or wrong depending on the
probable consequences/outcomes or practical implications arising therefrom. In this
sense, no act is to be judged as good or bad in itself but its wrongness or goodness is
dependent on the consequences of the action (Brown (a) 1995:41). An action will be right
if its good consequences outweigh bad ones (and vice versa). It is this ethical assumption
that undergirds Utilitarianism. In its classical version as developed by Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill in the 19th century, Utilitarianism presupposes that "those actions
are right or good that bring about the best end results [for the greatest number]" (ibid.). In
terms of practical experience, Utilitarian ethical theory is basically associated with utility
or satisfaction. The central tenet to this philosophical value-judgement, as originally
formulated by Jeremy Bentham, as already quoted above, is the need to seek "the greatest
happiness for the greatest number" (Goodin 1995:3). As a consequentialist ethical theory,
actions and decisions in the light of Utilitarianism are judged as good if they promote the
maximum good for the greatest numbers. While Utilitarianism may not necessarily be
anthropocentric, as Singer and Bentham would argue, however, in the context of this
paper, Utilitarianism is understood as essentially anthropocentric in orientation in that,
especially as far as public policies are concerned, the goal is to maximize the greatest
happiness for the greatest number of people.
The Utilitarian tradition, with its core ideal of maximising the greatest happiness for the
greatest number, has significantly influenced contemporary thinking and structures.
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Policy and decision-making, especially in modern democracies, reflect an inclination
towards the Utilitarian school of thought in terms of human welfare. This is more
pronounced in the neo-classical economics and political arena vis-a-vis environmental
policy and regulatory decision-making (Brown (a) 1995:41). In general terms,
"Utilitarianism presumes that all means find their justification in the ends they serve"
(Hodgson 1997:48). Affirming the pervasiveness of Utilitarian mode of thinking,
Glavovic observes that: "[m]odern conservation strategies are based on a simple
utilitarian philosophical assumption that environmental conservation will produce the
greatest good for the greatest number of people for the greatest period oftime" (1995:45).
The rationale behind such principles is hand in glove with the need for satisfying needs of
the greatest number of people (equity) across generations and within generations
respectively. It is this aspect of human utility of the environment that largely undergirds
environmental conservation.
For example, taking into account the history of this society, South Africa faces a
formidable challenge of addressing diverse disparities that enveloped South Africa prior
to 1994. Not least significant is the challenge to address the issue of massive poverty that
in the past has dehumanised mass populations of South Africa. Brown highlights this
challenge that governments seeks to address in the 21 st century by noting: "[a]s the 20th
century ends, most developed and developing nations assume that a major function of
government, if not the most fundamental and important one, is to provide citizens with a
healthy economy and opportunities for meaningful employment" (Brown (b) 1995:52).
In order to redress the past inequalities, South Africa has adopted certain policies which
take the form of Utilitarian approach. It suffices to say that, for example, GEAR (Growth,
Employment and Redistribution), South Africa's macro-economic policy, is Utilitarian-
oriented. Even though GEAR is not an environmental policy per se; however, its
significance for the objective of sustainable development cannot be underestimated.
Within the framework of advancing economic well-being for South Africans, the drive
behind GEAR is to "contribute to, rather than hinder, sustainable development"
(CENGOPO 1999:10). This pattern of development is informed by, and hence may not
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be divorced from NEMA as the overarching environmental legislation of South Africa,
which seeks to derive "lasting benefits [for people] from the conservation and sustainable
use of its rich biological diversity" (DEAT (a) 1997:3)(italics original). Environmental
conservation strategies embody instrumental value of the environment essentially
because "[t]he badness of environmental effects [are] measured in terms of the effect on
human experience" (Williams 1994:48). In this regard, the intent of the environmental
law of South Africa is to promote developmental activities that will bring about "lasting
benefits" for South Africans. In this particular sense, GEAR is Utilitarian.
In the light of the Utilitarian approach, an action will be deemed as moral if its
consequences tend to contribute to the goal of promoting and achieving "lasting benefits"
for the greatest number and vice versa. It follows then that, in order to obviate the poverty
the majority of South Africa's population faces and, instead, desirably achieving the
objectives of sustainable development, there are environmentally regulatory mechanisms
that South Africa has put into place.
2.3.1.2 Principle-based theories
Rather than determining wrongness or rightness of an action by depending on
consequence(s) as it is the case of Utilitarianism, rights and duties theories focus on pre-
established rules which are intended to guide moral actions. The underlying point of
departure of Kantian ethics, according to Des Jardins, is that ethics (or moral behaviour)
should be informed by those principles "on which we choose to act" (1993:33). In the
same vein, Davis says that "acting morally, as we ought to act, involves the self-
conscious acceptance of some (quite specific) constraints or rules that place limits on the
pursuit of our own interests and on our own pursuit of the general good" (1993:205). She
adds:
To act rightly, agents must first of all refrain from doing the things that can be
said (and known) to be, before the fact, wrong. The particular requirements to
refrain from doing the various things-that-can-be-known-before-the-fact-to-be-
wrong are variously called rules, laws, deontological constraints, prohibitions,
limitations, or norms (ibid.).
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A good example of principle-based theories is rights-based theories. In essence, this
category of theories presuppsoses "rights of individuals to take actions or of duties to
refrain from action" (Brown (a) 1995:43). The principle of duties and the notion of rights,
as features of deontological theories, would tend to offset the weakness inherent in the
Utilitarian tradition whereby lack of certainty of consequences of certain human actions
on the environment would undermine the attempt to determine the rightness of
consequences (Davis 1993:205). Or, from a different angle, in practical experience,
Utilitarian ethical justifications are put into check by deontological ethical justifications
that "certain actions are in themselves right or wrong (ibid.). It can thus be argued that
enforcement of deontological constraints or norms in society is expected to regulate
hwnan action vis-a-vis the environment.
Having said that, however, a clarity is needed to address two questions that eventually
follow in relation to the above formulation: 1) what exactly, then, is absolutely
right/wrong and how do we decide, and 2) how do we know, without being arbitrary,
when to move from a Utilitarian to a deontological stance? Considering that these issues
are of critical significance in their own right, however, it would be doing them injustice
to discuss them within the scope of this thesis.
2.3.1.2.1 Examples ofthe principle-based theories
The most crucial and unambiguous expression of deontology in South Africa's
Constitution is the provision ofhwnan rights. The need for the protection ofhwnan rights
is essentially informed by the asswnption not to treat people as means to an end, but
rather as ends in themselves. In this trend of moral framework, people have the obligation
of protecting the rights of fellow human beings because they have inherent worth.
Respect for and protection of other people's rights is in line with the Golden Rule which
states: "As ye would that men should do unto you, do ye to them likewise" (Midgley
1993: 10). The implication of the Golden Rule is that just as individuals would expect
others to treat them with respect, so would others expect those individuals to treat them
with respect.
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Environment/development-related examples of the principle-based theories are
Precautionary Principle (PP), the "Polluter Pays" Principle (PPP) and the Duty of Care
(DoC). The Precautionary Principle is consistent with the notion of ecological
sustainability in that it is about relieving pressure on the environment and giving it more
'space'. It is also a practical expression of intergenerational equity because to protect the
world for our descendants we need to be sure that our actions will not cause irreparable
harm to the environment (Carter 2001 :207). According to the "Polluter Pays" Principle,
"[w]here there is a significant reduction or loss of biodiversity but inadequate or
inconclusive scientific evidence to prove this, action should be considered to avoid or
minimise threats" (DEAT (a) 1997:2).
In other words, environmental laws, in one view, as "deontological constraints" serve the
purpose of this philosophical tradition. For instance, polluting a river would be
contravening the Water Pollution Act (a deontological constraint) that serves to promote
morality with respect to protecting an ecosystem. Thus, drawing from Davis' outline,
such laws are deontological in nature. However, even though deontological in nature, the
aspect of Utilitarianism becomes strengthened granted that their ultimate purpose is to
promote the "greatest happiness for the greatest numbers" of human beings. To this
extent, there is a fme line between deontological and Utilitarian implications of laws.
Equally, a classic example of environmental principle that has two facets of moral
imperative is the PPP. As a form of a "deontological constraint" the rationale of the PPP
is to curtail pollution, and promote a pollution-free society. People's right to a healthy
environment entrenched in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution operates on
this premise. But in the light of this version of human rights, in providing for this, the
Constitution places restriction on individuals (especially developers) to pollute the
environment to the detriment of health of others. However, a further assumption is that in
prohibiting pollution, other non-human entities will also be protected from pollution. In
the context of environmental ethics, this latter understanding points to what may be called
environmental rights. For example, the presupposition underlying an environmental right
embodied in South Africa's Bill of Rights, as Bray argues, though essentially
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anthropocentric (1998:9), also includes protection of the natural environment to 'secure
ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources' "(ibid.)(see also
Andrews 1998:2; Theron-Nelson 1999:209).
Another classic example of a principle in NEMA that is deontological in nature is the
"Duty of Care" (DoC). In line with this principle, "[a]ll people and organisations should
act with due care to conserve and avoid negative impacts on biodiversity, and to use
biological resources sustainably, equitably and efficiently" (DEAT (a) 1997:1)(my
italics). Thus, the DoC principle places an obligation on individuals to take care of the
environment. Though this principle is essentially legal, in its unambiguous expression, it
relates to religious-oriented philosophy of stewardship in the sense that, as Theron-
Nelson observes, "by placing emphasis on a 'duty' in a constitutional framework the
notion of stewardship is encapsulated" (1999:228).
2.3.1.3 Stewardship
Stewardship is a moral tradition that originates in ancient religions, Christianity being
one. There are two different strands that can be associated with the concept of
stewardship within the context of the Christian faith, and that might have affected
environmental ethics.
An egocentric view that humans are the centre of creation inculcates human propensity of
holding a rapacious attitude and behaviour towards nature ('strong anthropocentricism')
(Connelly and Smith 1999:11). The natural world and non-human life is perceived and
understood narrowly in instrumental terms; they exist for human benefit. It is argued that
this understanding of humanity's unquestionable elevated place has led to justifying
humans' dominion (in the negative sense of the word) over nature. This has subsequently
led to over-exploitation of natural resources.
A similarly anthropocentric, although a nuanced version of the ethic of stewardship
opposed to the one defined above, is that understanding of stewardship that presupposes
moral obligations on the part of present generations to future generations. According to
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Frome, the ethic of stewardship has emerged as "[t]he new awareness - a recognition that
a generation or nation or a whole society of nations cannot be the owners of the globe but
only its trustees on behalf of succeeding generations" (cited in Glavovic 1995:7)(my
italics).
The implication of this trend of thought is that the ethic of stewardship "imposes special
responsibilities as well as rights, and a demand for compassion and stewardship" (ibid.),
on the part of humans as higWy conscious beings towards nature. In this way, this moral
ethic presupposes that "[h]uman beings, although they have a privileged place in nature,
are exhorted to act responsibly and with consideration towards the natural world"
(Connelly and Smith 1999:12). This version of the principle of stewardship is
enlightening for environmental ethics. Rather than, on the one hand, promoting a
rapacious attitude and behaviour towards nature and, on the other hand, caring for nature
just because of its utility, stewardship entails that humans have to assume
environmentally responsible roles whereby the integrity of nature or creation as a whole
is cherished and promoted. Drawing from the biblical context, the ethical rationale behind
the Genesis garden paradigm is that "humanity's role is to tend and keep the garden
which God has granted dominion over; the injunction to replenish implies that it should
be kept fertile and not overworked" (ibid.). The ethical implications of this principle is
that, dominion [in the enlightened sense of the word], refers specifically to the task of
perpetuating God's purposes in creation rather than imposing humanity's self-serving
ends (see Connelly and Smith 1999; Glavovic 1995). Its significance for environmental
ethics is that,
at the very least it resonates with the sense that certain things should not be done,
despite their undeniable human benefits, and that wanton acts of despoliation or
cruelty or over-exploitation of natural resources should be avoided as exceeding
the legitimate role that [hu]mankind has been granted in relation to the natural
order (Connelly and Smith 1999:12-13).
Thus, an ethic of stewardship tends to foster the duty of care and nurturing on the part of
humans and hence, respecting the integrity of other forms of life besides human life. The
ethical implication of this trend of thought is that conservation policies and processes will
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not be based on philosophical justifications such as rights, but essentially because
humans are expected to tender and nurture the natural environment.
Having implied that the above principles can be potentially useful conceptual frameworks
for environmental ethics, however, it is the flawed interpretation and application of the
above moral philosophies that renders them ineffective for comprehensive environmental
ethics. Hodgson points out that: "[c]onsistent with the underlying utilitarian philosophy,
moral values and virtues, such as duty to others, care for the planet, respect for other
species and so on are considered only insofar as they yield utility" (1997:51). It is
significant that Hodgson covers all aspects that underlie the key ethical theories
considered in this thesis. What is appealing in Hodgson's critique is the exegesis of the
anthropocentric nature that environmental ethics takes. As implied in Hodgson's critique,
the moral imperative of, whether deontology (duty and rights), Utilitarianism or
stewardship, ultimately, however, hinges on human interests. In this sense, traditional
ethical theories do not offer us an all-encompassing morality which would tend to protect
the "values" of the environment that are independent of human utility.
2.4 Summary
A particular perception of human-nature relationship determines how people interact with
the environment. People attribute different values to the environment. Three notions of
value attributed to the environment would, in principle, determine how people would
manage or not manage the environment. The environment-related values underlying
environment/development-related policies reflect varied philosophical approaches to
environmental ethics.
This chapter shows that, on the one hand, an economic policy such as GEAR is
Utilitarian in that its orientation to environmental ethics alludes to maximizing benefits
for the people of South Africa. In this sense, as it has been argued above, that because
central to GEAR is the need to promote human needs and not the environment, it is
anthropocentric. While its goal is to inculcate an environmental consciousness, the utility
of the environment rather than protecting the environment for its own sake, holds sway in
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its scope. On the other hand, some provisions of South Africa's environmental legislation
such as the "Polluter Pays" Principle and the human rights provision are deontological in
the sense that there are pre-established rules which are meant to guide people's behaviour
pertaining to their relationship with the environment. Having said that, however, the
"Polluter Pays" Principle, for example, alludes to the Utilitarian tradition in the sense that
the aim is to promote the healthy environment of people, and hence it is anthropocentric.
However, the fact that the main aim is to meet human needs is the constraint that
frustrates environmental management processes and procedures, and hence there is need
that inherent worth be recognised in policy-making processes.
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CHAPTER THREE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: SETTING THE CONTEXT
3.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out significant events that are regarded as having made remarkable
contribution to an environmental consciousness paradigm. It outlines landmark events,
and the establishment of important environmental organisations that characterised
increasing awareness pertaining to how environmental issues and development were
perceived as being intrinsically intertwined. Most significantly, through the establishment
of the World Commission on Environment and Development and its oft-quoted
publication, Our Common Future, the concept of sustainable development was founded.
It is this report that has since widely influenced environmental thought and processes
both on national and international levels.
On the one hand, regarding the international aspect of the debate around sustainable
development, this chapter recognises and discusses World Conversation Strategy (WCS),
the Brundtland Commission (1987) and the Rio Earth Summit (1992) as some of the
events and institutions that marked headway in matters relating environment and
development. On the other hand, at a national level, this chapter discusses how South
Africa's environmental legislation and policies embody the core values of the concept of
sustainable development. This is in line with the observation that chapter two of South
Africa's Constitution, the Bill of Rights, embodies environmental rights, as a facet of
human rights. However, this chapter indicates that the thrust for sustainable development
is reflected in South Africa's National Management Policy (NEMA) which further gives
expression to other related environmental principles and provisions such as biodiversity,
conservation and GEAR as a macroeconomic policy. In sum, the main aim of this chapter
is merely to show the trajectory of the concept of sustainable development since it was
embraced on the international level and how it has since permeated environmental
legislation and development processes in nation states. At national level, a special
reference to South Africa will be made. Further, chapter four will provide a critical
analysis of South Africa's environmental legislation and the related development
policies.
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3.2 The International Context
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s one could confidently believe in certain grand
theories about development. Advocates of modernisation could believe that
growth and development were much the same thing and that development
involved a process of catching up. Latecomer societies had to learn from those
pioneer societies which had already moved to a state of modernity beyond the
state of Rostow-like 'take-off.' Meanwhile, dependency theorists and Marxists
alike could look forward to the collapse of the capitalist world economy....
Today, these nostrums comfort us no longer (Corbridge 1993:123)(my italics).
Based on the above quotation, one could say that prior to the above decades, development
was taken for granted. Due to the experiences of economic benefits that marked the era of
economic boom, ,humanity was almost oblivious to the latent environmental degradation
that accompanied development then. Prior to the World Wars, economic systems had
instilled hope for an economically brighter future for humanity. It was only when the
world economic systems, especially Northern industrial countries, started showing
significant signs of crumbling that nations realized that all was not rosy with the modes
of development pursued then. In sum, as Sachs seems to indicate, following the post-war
spin-offs, a bleak future loomed as a result of uncompromised development trends (Sachs
1992:26). Environmentally conscious people were starting to become disillusioned with
the vicissitudes of economic prosperity. The old certainties no longer seem to hold true
(Corbridge 1993:123). One area that caused great concern as a result of development was
that of environmental degradation. In other words, the questions of means (the
environment as a resource) were in conflict with the questions of ends (economic
growth): "environmental degradation is linked with patterns of economic development"
(Connelly and Smith 1999:57). In this regard, the hegemony underlying economic
growth, from then on, began to be questioned. Instead, for example, it occurred that
"[i]nfinite growth .. .is based on self-delusion, because the world is a closed space, finite
and of limited carrying capacity" (ibid.). In a nutshell, the imperative behind sustainable
development was a result of
the awareness of the major environmental threats facing humanity.. .leading to an
appreciation of the need to integrate environment and development, and of the
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growing interdependence between developed and developing countries and the
imperative of international cooperation to ensure sustainable development,
worldwide (Commonwealth Secretariat 1991:3).
The insight into the need to rethink development trends, then, was hence in the wake of
the realisation that "the environment has been under a heavy strain from a persistent lack
of or a lopsided type of development (as has been the experience of the developing world
during much of the post World War II period) or from rapid economic growth" (Intal
1998:239).
Based on the above state of affairs, one could say that it was such an experience that
marked a shift in developmental thinking and, hence, the concept of sustainable
development which, in a nutshell, "is as much about democracy as it is about limits to
growth and our relationship with the non-human world" (Connelly and Smith 1997:61).
For example, Sweden first moved a motion for the environment in 1972 at the UN
Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm as a result of its concern about
"acid rain, pollution in the Baltic, and the levels of pesticides and heavy metals in fish
and birds" (Sachs 1992:27). Issues such as population, food, human settlements, water,
desertification, science and technology, renewable energy, were recognised as of
international significance. This led to the initiation of groundwork by the Stockholm
Conference on Human Development that "set out to alter the post-war perception of an
open global space where many nations can individually strive to maximize economic
growth" (ibid.).
It was this paradigm shift in environmental consciousness, as a result of the experiences
of development-induced problems, that led to unfolding of subsequent international
events and processes pertaining to the connections between environment and
development. In the words of Pearce et ai, the "sustainable development debate has
tended to shift the focus away from growth versus the environment to one of the potential
complementarity of growth and environment" (1989:21). From a relatively different
angle, Carter echoes this by saying: "[s]ustainable development and its half-sister,
ecological modernisation, offer an alternative policy paradigm to the traditional model of
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environmental policy" (2001: 195). By and large, this is significant because "[t]he shift to
sustainable development ... primarily [marks] an ethical shift" (Kothari 1990:33).
3.2.1 World Conversation Strategy (WCS)
In response to reconcile the perceived conflict between environmental protection and
continuing economic growth, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (ruCN) and its counterparts attempted to chart a way forward for
sustainable development through the WCS. Adams identifies The World Conservation
Strategy (IUCN 1980) and Caring for the Earth (IUCN 1991) as two events associated
with the debate of sustainability where it "became the dominant leitmotifof the discourse
of development planners, commentators and bureaucrats .... had become an accepted part
of the rhetoric of Third World and First World politicians, and had provided a potent new
slogan and campaigning theme" (1992:207).
The significance of the WCS for sustainable development arises from the fact that it
"confirmed a growing belief that the assimilation of aims of both conservation and
development was the key to a sustainable society" (McCorrnick 1986: 177). In other
words, the point of departure of the WCS was "the premise of the need to conserve
ecosystems and [they subsequently] sought to demonstrate why this made good economic
sense" (Adams 1992:211). The nexus between sustainable development and conservation
is embodied in the explication of the latter as it implies "the management of human use of
the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations
while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations"
(as in Adams 1992:209).
It is essentially by harmonising concerns for the environment and development, in this
manner, thereby alluding to sustainable development, that the WCS must have influenced
environmental thinking and policy-making. This claim can be substantiated in the remark
that the final version of the WCS made room for "a consensus between the practitioners
of conservation and development" (Talbot 1984: 14). Although the insights in the WCS
then shaped environmental thinking by promoting ecological sustainability, however,
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according to Baker et aI., its limitations was that it did not draw connections between
social and economic issues (1997:2). However, having taken environment/development
discourse to this height, the fact still remains that the WCS provided a conceptual
framework against which the ideals of sustainable development could be furthered.
3.2.2 The Brundtland Commission
While the awareness about the twin problem between conventional economic growth and
environmental degradation emerged on the international scene in 1970s, as reflected in
the publication of the Club of Rome report The Limits to Growth in 1972 (Meadows et
al), the concept of sustainable development gained remarkable international significance
in the 1980s. It was as a result of the publication of Our Common Future, otherwise
known as the Brundtland Commission Report, by the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED 1987), that the concept of sustainable
development reached its zenith. Adams writes that Our Common Future "captures the
'spirit of Stockholm 1972' [by placing] elements of the sustainable development debate
within the economic and political context of international development, and it puts
environmental issues firmly on the political agenda" (1992:211).
The Commission opened up a significant avenue whereby the objectives of development
and environment were portrayed as intrinsically intertwined. In other words, as Sachs
puts it, the Brundtland Report then, announced "the marriage between the craving for
development and concern for the environment" (1992:28). With this insight in mind, the
thrust of development discourse was that development and environment were not to be
divorced from each other. The challenge was "to redirect the pattern of development, as
well as the policy and institutional environments, to more effectively manage the trade-
offs among economic growth, social equity, and environmental protection" (Intal
1998:239).
While the concept of sustainable development rejuvenates the need for promoting human
welfare by wedding environment to development, its objective nevertheless necessitated
a comprehensive approach to institutional policy-design so as to achieve the desired
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sustainability. In fact, the advocates of sustainable development in the late 1980s and the
early 1990s saw the need for integration of environmental, social and economic aspects in
policy making as "being simply to bring the three areas of policy and decision-making
into closer contact to enable them to inform each other, rather than allowing each to
continue to be a separate policy stream" (Holtz 1998:284)(my italics). To that effect, the
report emphatically called for global action so as to promote sustainable development
based on the insight that "the sustainability of a healthy economy depends on sustaining a
healthy environment" (Owen 1998: 117). According to Sachs, this is encapsulated in the
formula: "No development without sustainability; no sustainability without development"
(1992:29). This form of thinking subsequently informed its articulation of the oft-quoted
definition of the concept, as I have already quoted above, as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs" (WCED 1987:5). According to Baker et aI., the Report recognised the
significance of the fact that the concept provides "a framework for the integration of
environmental policies and development strategies" (1997:3)(italics original) and hence
challenges the understanding that environmental protection can only be achieved at the
expense ofeconomic development" (ibid.)(italics original).
Having alluded to the Commission's conceptualisation about the interdependence
between environment and development, the focus in conventional debate has since
shifted from earlier argument about the compatibility between the two objectives to a
present preoccupation with how different forms of development can be environmentally
sustainable (ibid.). Put differently, as in the original version of the Brundtland Report's
understanding of sustainable development, some crucial issues, which still undergird
contemporary environment/development thinking and processes, whether implicitly or
explicitly, are evident. Equally crucial issues added to the list as concerns for sustainable
development are utilitarian-oriented concepts of inter-generational and intra-generational
equity in resource use. The former idea refers to "including the needs of future
generations in the design and implementation of current policy" (Baker, et al. 1997:4).
The latter notion points to "the importance of meeting the basic needs of present
generations, where poverty is seen as both a cause and a consequence of sustainable
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behaviour" (ibid.). These concepts, although anthropocentric, are ethically significant in
the sense that they presuppose an equitable use of resources amongst and across
generations. Notwithstanding the overall environmental insights that sustainable
development offers in the public arena, there are crucial constraints that accompany the
concept of sustainable development and its implications (Baker et al. 1997; Richardson
1997; Rist 1999). These will be spelt out in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
3.2.3 Rio Earth Summit
Granted that the discourse of sustainable development was taken to its height at
Brundtland Commission, the next step then was how its core ideals were to be
concretized. However, in the wake of the realisation that "economic and social systems
and ecological conditions" (Baker et al. 1974:4) are complex from one country to another
and hence, according to the Brundtland Report, it was the responsibility of policy makers
(in particular contexts) to translate the recommendations into practice. This need saw the
birth of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. Thus, the purpose of the Rio Summit was to
further the aims of the Brundtland Commission. This is substantiated by the Principles
adopted at Rio. For example, Principle four of the Rio Declaration states that "in order to
achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it" (UNCED
1992 (b)).
Indeed, as a follow-up event to the Brundtland Report, in trying to address the dilemma
that poverty is a major cause of environmental degradation, Principle four of the Rio
Declaration responds to this by stipulating that "eradicating poverty is an indispensable
requirement for sustainable development" (UNCED 1992 (a)). The focus of this
challenge pertaining to sustainable development was the national level. In other words,
the Rio Summit was meant to chart a way forward of how core principles of sustainable
development identified at international level were to be fostered at nation-states level and
its particular domestic constituencies or localities. This is reflected in the heading of
chapter two of Agenda 21: "international cooperation to accelerate sustainable
development in developing countries and related domestic policies" (UNCED 1992 (b)).
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3.3 Local Context
Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994, there have been various socio-
economic and political developments in the country. The new political dispensation,
caused South Africa to resurface on the international scene. Circumstances around this
political development necessitated South Africa to revise its policies in various sectors in
accordance with the ideals promoted at the international/regional level. Consequently,
this development has led South Africa to affirm, either in principle or in practice, ideals
or values that are deemed instrumental to ultimately achieving the common good.
One area where transformation has been initiated is that of policy and decision-making
pertaining to development vis-a.-vis the environment. Just as in many other countries on
the continent and in the sub-Saharan region, and the world beyond, South Africa has
embraced and seeks to uphold the ideals of sustainable development. CENGOPO seems
to confIrm this by stating: "South Africa is responding to environmental change by
signing international agreements, passing national laws and developing national policies,
implementing management strategies, monitoring and research, raising awareness, and
through education" (1999:28). It is equally echoed by CENGOPO: "[c]hanges in sectoral
policies have mainly been towards more sustainable practices" (CENGOPO 1999: 10).
Thus, there have been attempts that development policies are tailored in such a way that
economic needs and environmental concerns are harmonised. This is also the case to
respond to the "constitutional culture" that South Africa has embraced and seeks to
promote. This "constitutional culture" is embedded in chapter two of South Africa's
Constitution, the Bill of Rights.
3.3.1 South Africa's Constitution: the Bill of Rights
South Africa's Constitution can be regarded as an umbrella tool that aims to safeguard
and promote the values that South Africa seeks to achieve pertaining to the environment.
The DEAT says: "[t]he starting point for developing environmental policy in South
Africa is the Constitution. The adoption of a democratic Constitution and Bill of Rights
has made government accountable to the people" (DEAT (b) 1997:38).
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One of the pronounced features in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution is the
centrality of human rights. Within a broader framework of human rights, for example,
section 24 of the Bill of Rights foregrounds and stipulates people's right to a healthy
environment as a facet of human rights. In this section, everyone has the right to:
(a) an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and
(b) to have an environment protected, for the benefit of present and future
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that-
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural
resources (DEAT (a) 1997:1).
It is significant to note that the Bill of Rights is regarded as "a cornerstone of democracy
in South Africa.... It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affIrms the
democratic values of human dignity, equity and freedom" (Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa s 7(1). In this sense, the Bill of Rights is of paramount importance
because it embodies the overall vision of what sort of society South Africa is striving to
be. It encompasses the fundamental values and virtues that are deemed to be instrumental
in achieving a particular vision whereby "development and the environment are partners"
(DEAT (b) 1997:5)(my italics). Hypothetically speaking, it is this vision that informs
environmental/development thinking and policy-making in South Africa. Thus, as an
examplar of the Brundtland Commission, South Africa's Constitution alludes to the core
ideal of sustainable development which itself, prima jacie, presupposes a harmonious
relation between humanity and the environment.
The goal of promoting a harmonious relationship between people and the environment is
entrenched in the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (1998). It seeks to
promote human behaviour or activities that are deemed environmentally friendly in South
Africa. As DEAT states, NEMA provides a "general framework within which
environmental management and implementation plans must be formulated" (1998:12). Its
fundamental objective is to regulate the manner in which the environment is managed (or
not managed). In this Act, the environment is defined as "the natural environment and the
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physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties of it that influence human health and
well-being" (DEAT 1998:2).
It is the above aspects of the environment that NEMA aims to protect, evidently, taking
into consideration the values embodied in the Bill of Rights above. This is taken into
cognizance in addressing national priorities which the government seeks to achieve. One
such national priority is South Africa's macro-economic policy, Growth, Employment
and Redistribution (GEAR). With respect to this policy, the government strives to, among
other things, create jobs, create equity, increase exports and promote growth in Growth
Domestic Product (GDP) (CENGOPO 1999:9). Although these objectives initially do not
necessarily arise from a sustainable development paradigm, according to CENGOPO, the
ultimate idea is that "they contribute to, rather than hinder, sustainable development"
(1999:10). The significance of environmentally conscious approach to development is
also spelt out in the Environmental Management Policy which presupposes the
"ownership of sustainable development as the accepted approach to resource
management and utilisation in South Africa, thus entrenching environmental
sustainability in policy and practice" (DEAT (b) 1997:13)(my italics). In sum, South
Africa's environmental legislation and development-related policies such as GEAR
allude to the ideals of sustainable development.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the environmental paradigm shift which generically became
known as sustainable development. This paradigm shift marked humanity's awareness
that development activities brought about adverse environmental effects which would
compromise the well-being of present as well as future generations. In essence, it was
understood that there was a close connection between development and the environment.
This form of environmental consciousness manifested in the establishment of various
international events. In connection to this, this chapter has discussed international events
and structures such as the World Conservation Strategy (WCS)(1980), the Brundtland
Commission (1987) and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, and insights into environmental
matters that defined them in their own respects. What characterised these was the
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fundamental imperative that environmental concerns needed to be incorporated into
development policies and activities.
However, it has also been pointed out that the above developments on the international
scene have since widely shaped environmental thought and processes. At national level, a
special mention has been made of South Africa as having embraced a form of
environmental consciousness that alludes to the concept of sustainable development. One
of the main reasons why South Africa have subscribed to this paradigm shift is that in its
subsequent resurfacing on the international scene due to the new political dispensation
that was ushered in in 1994 necessitated South Africa to adopt values that are deemed as
edifying at the international level. This need was responded to through the adoption of a
new Constitution the aim of which is to promote a particular "constitutional culture" as
entrenched in chapter two, the Bill of Rights. South Africa has formulated
environment/development-related laws and policies that are meant to respect and promote
the democratic values that are embodied in the Bill of Rights. The National
Environmental Management Act (NEMA)(1998) has specially been cited as a piece of
South Africa's environmental legislation that embodies sustainable development-related
ideals. NEMA as an overarching environmental legislation subsequently permeates






Having shown in chapter three that South Africa has adopted environmental legislation
meant to foster sustainable development, however, there are constraints associated with
it. Even though environmental concerns are incorporated into South Africa's
environmental law, they are only determined from human perspectives and concerns.
This chapter will discuss how flawed South Africa's Bill of Rights, environmental
legislation and its macro-economic policy are in terms of a holistic environmental ethic.
What runs through this chapter is the thesis that the Bill of Rights and relevant
environmental provisions characterise a dualistic understanding of reality whereby
humans and nature are regarded as separate. According to Plumwood, in this trend of
thought, "what is characteristically and authentically human is defined against or in
opposition to what is taken to be natural, nature, or the physical or biological realm"
(1994:147). While it may not be refuted that South Africa's Constitution tends to
inculcate an environmentally conscious culture, the intent of environmental legislation
initially is human rights rather than environmental rights per se. Environmental law is
meant to serve as a means to promoting human rights provided for in the Bill of Rights.
This is the tenet of what Plumwood (1994) and Sterba (2000) call the Discontinuity
Problem. Using this principle as an analytical tool, the contention is that the
environmental crisis is merely a manifestation of asymmetrical relationships between
humans. This chapter discusses different ecological models that tend to challenge a
truncated view of reality as highlighted in the Discontinuity Problem.
4.2 The "Discontinuity Problem" and Sustainability
The main focus of this chapter is to discuss how problematic our ethical frameworks and
systems and, in this regard, South Africa's Constitution and its concomitant
development/environment-related policies is for sustainability. This is not to say that
other problems, for example, poverty and the booming population, do not contribute to
environmental degradation. However, the assumption of this thesis is that environmental
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'degradation and hence unsustainability is rooted in a perception of reality which
reinforces relationships which characterises hierarchical trends. It is humanity's
environmental consciousness. Environmental degradation is merely a manifestation of
this state of affairs. As Murray Boochin (founder of Social Ecology informed by Karl
Marx) elaborates:
[T]he roots of environmental problems lie in human relations to one another
rather than (as deep ecologists suggest) in human misunderstanding of their
connection with the natural world. Many human societies ... are organized into
hierarchical layers of dominance and oppression, where some classes of people
and some kinds of human qualities or abilities are regarded as superior to others-
for instance, men are thought superior to women, intellectual skills superior to
physical skills (cited in Palmer 1997: 17).
Relationships of dominance and oppression are extended to, and it suffices to say, they
are more pronounced in relationships between humans and non-humans. It is especially
with respect to this fashion of relationships that Ecofeminism has become a force, as it
will be discussed in chapter five. However, from an Ecofeminist perspective, Gaard
provides an outline about how relationships of dominance and oppression manifests
themselves:
human/nature dualism . . . underlies and undermines our relations to the
environment, other people, and that which is embodied and unmediated in
ourselves. One effect of this split is that we understand personal and collective
histories from a culturally ingrained, dualistic perspective. This perspective
perpetuates dynamics that have consistently oppressed women and other
nondominant groups, and exploited nonhuman nature (1993:7).
Humanity's consciousness pertaining to the environment is truncated. The above
quotation characterises the Discontinuity Problem. In the light of this notion,
anthropocentric ethics presupposes a "dualism to a network of related dualisms"
(Plumwood 1994: 153). According to this view, "humans are superior overall to the
members of other species" (Sterba 1996:645). According to Plumwood, antagonistic
perceptions of reality arise whereby being a human is understood in opposition to or
against nature (1994: 147). What ultimately follows then is that anthropocentrism
inculcates the fallacy that humans are "the crown of creation, the source of all value, the
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measure of all things" (Taylor 1986:243-6). The argument here is that the human claim of
human superiority is fallacious because it is self-defmed. The terms and criteria used to
buttress this claim of superiority are subjective; they are influenced and fraught with
human ideals and, therefore, interests. Consequently, the claim of human superiority is
reliant on circular logic in that the determining features are, in essence, in tune with
boundaries defined by human beings. This is a manifestation of "shallow ecology" in that
"[it] views humans as above or outside of nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes
only instrumental, or 'use', value to nature" (Capra 1996:6). As result, the "Discontinuity
Problem" characterises nature-human relatedness in a dichot~manner such that it
culminates in the understanding of reality that
typically polarizes difference and rrnmrruzes shared characteristics, construes
difference along lines of superiority/inferiority, and views the inferior side as a
means to the higher ends of the superior side (the instrumental thesis). Because
its nature is defmed oppositionally, the task of the superior side, that in which it
realizes itself and expresses its nature, is to separate from, dominate, and control
the lower side (Plumwood 1994: 146)(my italics).
It is the hypothesis of this chapter that this perceived antagonism is the root of the
problem. By creating boundaries between human and non-human species, and
subsequently, regarding humans as superior to non-human species, grounds for satisfying
human welfare tend to hold sway in anthropocentric environmental and utilitarian ethics.
The environment is valued for its utility rather than its non-instrumental value. By
dogmatically asserting the superiority of humans over other entities, humanity creates
"species-boundaries" that selfishly qualify other humans while non-human species are
thrown out of the moral community. While on some philosophical accounts it is only
those beings who can mutually interact morally that constitute a "moral community",
however, in the context of this discussion, the term is used advisedly. For example, since
animals cannot interact morally with humans, and are not necessarily part of the moral
community, this does not rule out the idea that they nevertheless deserve our respect. In
contrast, the Discontinuity Problem as an expression of anthropocentricism, engenders an
ethic that is human-centred, or from a feminist perspective, andocentric.
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The apt verSiOn of anthropocentricism alluding to the problem of discontinuity is
powerfully revealed in Singer's evocative concept of speciesism, that is, "a prejudice or
attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against
those of members of other species" (Singer 2000:54). It promotes anthropocentric
approaches to environmental ethics whereby one's perception of reality is looked at from
a human perspective. The philosophy that underlies anthropocentricism, as already shown
above, is that humans are the centre of creation and hence superior to other entities in the
universe. As Mary Boochin argues, "[t]he idea that the natural world is inferior to human
beings and are there to be exploited and abused stems from, and is an expression of, the
hierarchical nature of human relationships with one another" (cited in Palmer 1997:17).
4.2.1 The "Discontinuity Problem" and the Bill of Rights
Chapter two of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, epitomises what Bell (2001) calls
"human jurisprudence"; "a system of laws designed to recognize the pre-eminence of the
human species" (2001 :9). One of the pronounced features that suggest this about South
Africa's Constitution is the centrality of human rights.
Chapter two of South Africa's Constitution, the Bill of Rights, reflects a utilitarian
approach to the environment. Critically analyzing this clause, one discovers that points
(i), (ii) and (iii) are meant to qualify the foregoing right which comprises (a) and (b).
Granted that "rights are the appropriate method of addressing the question of value"
(Theron 1997:29), the phrase "right to a healthy environment" implies that what really is
of value is not the environment per se but the health of South Africans. Environment in
this case is ascribed instrumental value vis-a-vis human health. In the same light, the
phrase "[the right] to have an environment protected", qualifies the goal to benefit present
and future generations of humans. Thus, environmental law such as the Anti-Pollution
Act is a means of achieving the value of human health. This observation can further be
substantiated in the principle of local standi or standing to sue provided for in chapter
three of South Africa's Constitution. Section 7(4)(b) allows a range of people and persons
to apply for appropriate constitutional relief. These include:
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• a person acting in his or her own interest;
• an association acting in the interests of its members;
• a person acting on behalf of another person who is not in a position to seek
such relief in his or her own name;
• a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of
persons; or
• a person action [sic] in the public interest
• a person acting on behalf of the environment (DEAT 1998:8).
Even though people would be led to believe that Section 24 of the Bill of Rights
"embodies an environmental right" (Bray 1998:9), as the last aspect above entails, it is
conspicuous that the principle of local standi reflects that, in all the above aspects, court
relief is only meant for humans. Would it not make a difference if a clause would be
included whereby, for example, environmental groups would seek constitutional relief in
the "interest" of environmental entities? Since "[h]aving a right to something (in this
instance, to a healthy life) usually means that other individuals have a duty to protect that
right" (Palmer 1997:51), in this respect, it becomes evident that a "right to ... " represents
human interests and needs. To this effect, it becomes appealing to deduce that the Bill of
Rights is a form of human jurisprudence that essentially tends to protect the rights of
humans. To further the aims of the Constitution vis-a-vis environmental management,
NEMA contains a number of environment-oriented principles.
4.2.1.1 The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP)
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the PPP
"provides that environmental policies should be based on the principle that the polluter
should pay" (OECD cited in Henderson 1995:60). The ideologies which NEMA tend to
serve can be reflected in its principles. Even though this principle cannot be undermined
as it helps to curtail environmentally unfriendly behaviour, however, what underlies the
principle is the utility of a pollution-free environment for people; this is encapsulated in
South Africa's Bill of Rights; "a right to a healthy environment". In sum, the
environment is regarded as a means to an end, a human need - pollution-free society.
Further, this principle is ethically constrained in the sense that damage done to an
ecosystem cannot be tantamount to money. This is the reflection of modem market
economies which are obsessed with objectifying environmental entities. Environmental
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laws in this way allude to market values that are purely utilitarian and anthropocentric.
This trend of regarding the environment as an object does a disservice to the concept of
an "Earth Jurisprudence" which regards "[t]he universe is a communion of subjects, not a
collection of objects. As subjects, the component members of the universe are capable of
having rights" (Bell 2001:7).
Hence, in light of the above, Bray is right to acknowledge that "the Bill of Rights
embodies an environmental right which is essentially anthropocentric in nature" (1998:9).
To this extent, it can be argued that the Bill of Rights embodies environmental principles
that take the form of an anthropocentricism that is primarily concerned with pollution,
resource depletion and health of humans rather than the integrity of creation per se. In
this case, as Palmer observes, "[i]ndirectly, the environment is perceived as important
because a healthy natural environment is usually thought to be vital for the well-being of
present and future human beings" (1997:92). For these reasons, the environment is
ethically important in terms of sustainability; with a damaged environment, it might be
impossible to meet the needs of present people or for future people to meet their own
needs (Palmer 1997:93). In other words, the ethical foundations of the Bill of Rights and
subsequently, environmental principles such as the PPP are based on a variety of human
values: "the preservation of human health and safety, human social and economic
requirements, human aesthetic and cultural pleasures" (Palmer 1997:116). In sum, it is
the interests of people, human health, safety and needs and hence sustainability, that the
law tends to protect. To this effect, as Palmer deduces, the environment is regarded as a
means to achieving these human ends (ibid.).
Hence, in an attempt to effect a desired change, South Africa has formulated policies and
provisions which are commensurate with a vision that cultivates an environmental
morality. Its vision, that is meant to give an expression to the Bill of Rights, has been
embraced within a broader framework of environment/development-related issues in
varied sectoral structures and processes so as to realise values and virtues which South
Africa deems to be instrumental to achieving an ideal moral society vis-a-vis
environmental concerns. Put differently, the above vision permeates various aspects of
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institutional policy- and decision-making. For example, within the scope of the original
vision, the overall aim of conservation is to foster "[an] environmentally conscious
nation, whose people are in harmonious coexistence with the natural environment, and
which derives lasting benefits from the conservation and sustainable use of its rich
biological diversity" (DEAT (b) 1997:20).
In principle, by harmonising the relation between humans and the environment in this
manner, it can be said that NEMA and its subsidiary provisions incorporates an ethically
based approach to environmental decision-making and processes whereby,
philosophically speaking, the dualism between human and non-human worlds is diluted.
Though it suggests "a philosophical position where humanity and nature are separate
from one another" (Palmer 1997:115), yet, this is environmentally significant because, "it
envisions harmony between the two rather than enmity" (ibid.).
4.3 National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)(l989)
NEMA (1989) as a piece of environmental regulation is the cornerstone of South African
environmental policy. Being informed by the idea that "many inhabitants of South Africa
live in an environment that is harmful to their health and wellbeing" (DEAT 1998:2),
NEMA in that regard highlights the following issues:
everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health
or wellbeing;
the State must respect, protect and fulfil the social, economic and environmental
rights of everyone and strive to meet the basic needs of previously disadvantaged
communities;
inequality in the distribution of wealth and resources, and the resultant poverty,
are among the important causes as well as the results of environmentally harmful
practices;
sustainable development requires the integration of social, economic and
environmental factors in the planning, implementation and evaluation of
decisions to ensure that development serves present and future generations;
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everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the benefit of
present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures
that
prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
promote conservation; and
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources
while promoting justifiable economic and social development (ibid.).
Regarding NEMA as a cornerstone of environmental management of South Africa, the
above statements reflect particular values and ethical positions that infonn
development/environment-related processes and projects in South Africa. It can be
regarded as "a law that incorporates an ethically based environmental approach
to ...decision-making" (Sagoff 1981:60). This is affinned in South Africa's vision
whereby "people are in hannonious coexistence with the natural environment (DEAT (a)
1997:1). In this regard, the aim ofNEMA is to regulate "human conduct for a particular
purpose" (Glavovic 1995:41). In sum, it can be deduced that NEMA embodies principles
and provisions that are intended to inculcate a morality and ideals that would engender
ethical commitment on the part of the public.
However, even though the rationale of NEMA is an effort to hannonise the apparent
conflict between development needs and environmental concerns, it seems that, in the
true sense, the environment is only subsumed in the human appraisal of 'environmental
concern'. In other words, while it is significant that NEMA embraces environmental
concerns, however, its ethical orientation is purely anthropocentric. Chapter one,
principle two of NEMA reflects: "[e]nvironmental management must place people and
their needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological,
developmental, cultural and social interests equitably" (DEAT 1998:6)(my italics). The
contention of this chapter is that all the related environmental policies are infonned by
this ethical position, an anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics. This can be
substantiated in the manner in which "environment" is defined in NEMA:
the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of
(i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth;




any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships
among and between them; and
the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and
conditions of the foregoing that influence human health and well-
being (Office of the President 1998:8, xi)(my italics).
What is suspect about this defInition of environment is that it is with reference to
humanity that the other components of environment, for example the land, are defIned.
While the preposition "within" denotes a relationship of location, however, it does not
paint a picture of a relationship of interconnectedness between humans and other entities
of the environment as more profound schools of thought such as Deep Ecology,
Ecofeminism and the Gaia hypothesis presuppose. Within the anthropocentric scope of
understanding, humanity provides a point of reference for this relationship. Put
differently, the connotation inherent in defIning "environment" is that other aspects of
environment are accorded signifIcance with reference to people.
The above defInition of the environment as that which surrounds humans is problematic
in the sense that it seemingly negates the fact that humanity is intrinsically part of the
environment. Cobb seems to raise the same concern: "The term 'environmental problem'
is already too anthropocentric. It suggests that there are human beings and that everything
exists as only our environment" (1980:447). The environment is not necessarily out there.
If air and water are constituent of the environment, how do we explain the fact that we
breathe air and that our bodies are seventy per cent water. The expression "influence
human health and well-being" supports the argument that the environmental concerns are
not necessarily with environment but with regard to people. In this regard, it can be said
that NEMA characterises an anthropocentric ethic and is hence regarded as a means to an
end inasmuch as "nature is seen only in relation to what it can provide in the service of
humankind (O'Riordan cited in Baker 1997:10).
In this fashion, NEMA necessarily incorporates environmental concerns because "a
healthy natural environment is usually thought to be vital for the well-being of present
and future human beings" (Palmer 1997:92). It is presumed that unless the environment is
managed, it will hinder the goal of sustainability, that is, meeting our present needs and
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for future generations to meet their needs. In the absence of human needs, thus it can be
argued, the environment is valued instrumentally as a means for achieving human ends.
A thing's being of human utility forms part of the sustainabi1ity equation. It is in this
regard that the environment is accorded moral respect (Pa1mer 1997:93). It is human
rationality that presupposes the instrumental value of the environment, and hence
undergirds sustainable development.
4.3.1 Integrated Environmental Management (lEM)
What underlies the concept of sustainable development IS the need for taking
environmental concerns into cognisance in development procedures and processes. To
foster this objective, and to obviate the constraints that accompanied Environmental
Impact Assessments (EIAs), in 1984, South Africa's Council For The Environment
formulated IEM (Rid! 1994:62). Its purpose is to "guide, rather than impede the
development process" by resolving or mitigating "any negative environmental impacts
and to enhance positive aspects of development proposals" (ibid.). This is a
recommendab1e step which signifies the extent to which South Africa regards sustainable
development as an ethical ideal.
However, having said this, the extent to which tools like IEM present the holistic nature
of environmental ethics becomes ethically questionable. It seems it is more inclined
towards human concerns and interests than those of non-human species. Rid1 observes:
IEM as it is applied in South Africa tends to favour humanistic bias in the
evaluation process; it is the social and economic impacts, both positive and
negative, which dominate the value judgements which are applied.
'Environmental impact' is perceived as an impact which has a direct bearing on
human well-being (1994:69).
Or, as Cobb comments about the anthropocentric nature of the term "environmental
problem", "[t]he problem is that this environment may not continue to serve human needs
adequately" (1980:447).
The claim that Rid1 makes that 'environmental impact' relates to deve10pmentally
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adverse effects on human well-being can be substantiated in the manner in which, for
example, "Interested and Affected Parties" is defmed as:
Parties directly affected by the proposed development
Parties who are not directly affected but may have the public interest at heart
The authorities under whose jurisdiction the proposed development or activity
falls (Ridl1994:74).
The above definition of "Affected and Interested Parties" is open to criticism as far as
holistic environmental ethics entails. The conspicuousness of the environment is
underlined by its omission from the above. It implies that 'environmental impacts' are in
this sense only by implication. What environmental techniques and procedures purport to
be 'environmental impact' necessarily impinges on the welfare of people not the physical
environment per se. Put differently, 'environmental impacts' are determined in line with
human measure of costs and benefits associated with development vis-a-vis human well-
being. In light of this, it can be deduced that it is humans (and in this case the "Interested
and Affected Parties") while it could be biodiversity that will be affected as a result of
development in a particular place. In this sense, IEM as a tool to achieving sustainable
development embodies a "watered-down anthropocentricism". This points to the fact that
"a modicum of attention is paid to environmental - as distinct from ecological -
concerns, within the overall context of continued plundering of Earth's resources" (Orton
cited in Richardson 1997:46). As Ridl further claims, using a human index to appraise
'environmental impacts' will characteristically lead to "placing short term material
wealth ahead oflong term environmental prosperity" (1994:69-70).
It is fascinating to critically consider the question posed: "Considering South Africa's
need for economic growth, can we afford to allow development to be held back by
environmental concerns" (Rid! 1994:3)? This is an appealing question that underlines the
ethical dilemma in balancing economic needs, on the one hand, and environment
concerns, on the other. The need to balance the two above aspects is probably more
significant in South Africa than in many countries where sustainable development goals
are pursued (considering the massive inequalities engendered by the apartheid regime
legacy). An attempt to address such disparities is the main objective of GEAR: "through
its macro-economic policy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), the
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government strives to, among other things, create jobs, create equity, increase exports and
promote growth in Growth Domestic Product (GDP)" (CENGOPO 1999:9).
However, addressing issues such as poverty depends on a natural resource base. It has
been argued that both growth and employment are instrumental to addressing
environmental ills before sustainability can be achieved (WCED 1987:63). However,
Redclift argues that "[i]n practice, increased private consumption is seen as the key
policy lever" (1999:63). The argument against this is that consumption will result in
chain-like phenomena which will have knock-on effects on the environment and hence,
will compromise sustainability. Striving for growth and employment would require, for
example, private investments. But investors such as multinational companies use
enormous stocks of natural resources in the particular localities of their operation and
hence, exploit various resources. This will subsequently put pressure on natural
resources. There are equally other ethical issues that accompany investment operations
such as production processes. For example, the manufacturing industry is one of the most
income-fetching in South Africa. Increase in manufacturing industry will result in huge
pollution of different sorts. This is the predicament which many countries face. A
classical example in South Africa is the case of the South Durban Industrial Basin
(SDIB). Air pollution, arising from industrial emissions of toxic substances, has
manifested and resulted in increased cases of ailments such as asthma and leukemia. The
oil refineries and chemical plants in the area emit toxic gases such as carbon dioxide,
benzene, ethyl benzene (Mercury 24/07/2000). Even though the severity of the problem
has elicited intensified public opposition and attracted media hype, however, it happens
that in a policy arena where there is a conflict of interests, the economic needs and
interests tend to override environment concerns. Redclift seems to provide a better
exegesis of political economy vis-a-vis environmental issues:
The creation of wealth, as a policy objective, tends to confine environmental
factors to the closet, enabling politicians to wring their hands over the supposed
high levels of unemployment that higher environmental standards herald, or the
dangers of interfering with market forces which are assumed to work best when
they are free from government control (1999:62).
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4.3.1.1 South Africa's Biodiversity Policy and Conservation
In South Africa, as already mentioned above, the need for providing for and promoting
the "common good" is evident when one studies the Bill of Rights in South Africa's
Constitution and its macro-economic policy - Growth, Employment and Redistribution.
Conservation of the environment does not stand independently of its objective to promote
human welfare. It is, rather, the value of conserving the environment for maximum
human benefit that is a determinant in environmental management. Unless we recognise
that conservation of the environment will lead to achieving the maximum good as a
consequence, the significance of environmental conservation becomes diluted in the light
of an anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics. The basic drive is not necessary
to conserve natural resources, but to meet human needs and interests. The implication is
that it is only when human survival is threatened that consideration is, in turn, given to
environmental management.
To put it into perspective, it IS curiosity about human welfare with respect to
environmental management, that is the core of environmental policies as opposed to
concern with the environment itself. The distinction here is that the former orientation
does not embody inherent worth of the environment and vice versa. It is precisely
because human welfare is at risk that the need for conserving the environment becomes
compelling. In line with this observation, O'Riordan concurs by saying: "[f]or the poor
South these [environmental crises] are potentially devastating dangers, but they are not so
clearly a matter of priority as is the day-to-day requirement survival that affects most of
its people" (2000:34). Thus, it is the ethos of human survival that essentially informs the
need for environmental management rather than of protecting the environment itself. It is
the need for maximising the "collective good" that informs the principles of sustainable
development. In this case, one may argue that what is at stake is not the natural
environment but human survival. In other words, human survival is central to
environmental conservation policies as opposed to the inherent worth of the environment
per se. It is this anthropocentric and hence utilitarian approach to environmental ethics
that underlies South Africa's Biodiversity Policy. Its concern for human survival is
highlighted in the following manner:
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What will happen if we do not take immediate action? We will undermine the
natural resource base upon which people depend; we will foreclose existing and
future economic opportunities of using biodiversity; and we will jeopardise
ecological processes which are necessary to keep our country fit for life (DEAT
(a) 1997:3).
In this regard, the intent of the policy is essentially to safeguard interests and needs of
South Africans. This implies that concern for the loss of biodiversity arises out of the fact
that it impinges ultimately on the well-being of people rather than of the environment
itself. This can further be substantiated in the manner in which the phrase "benefits
derived from" recurs in defining the utility purpose of South Africa's biodiversity. The
policy outlines a wide range of benefits which, inter alia, include:
• maintenance of the hydrological cycle, and thus the provision of clean water;
• maintenance of atmospheric quality, which in turn provides pure air to breathe
and helps to control the climate;
• the generation and conservation of soils, which are essential to agriculture and
forestry;
• protection from erosion;
• nutrient cycling;
• pollutant breakdown and absorption;
• control of many potential crop pests and vectors of disease;
• the pollination of many crops;
• maintenance of a vast resource of genetic materials from which South Africa
and other countries have developed crops, domestic animals, medicines and
industrial products; and
• perhaps most importantly, the insurance and basis for adaptation which
biodiversity provides against large changes in climate and ecosystem
processes a factor of particular concern to South Africa, whose climate is
expected to become increasingly drier as global climate changes (DEAT (a)
1997:4).
What clearly emerges from the above outline is that biodiversity caters for human-related
welfare. Within this constitutionalised environmental framework, biological diversity is
of moral significance for the sake of amenities it offers to South Africans as opposed to
its being. Hence, what underlies South Africa's conservation policy (as all conservation
policies elsewhere) as an issue-problem policy is the idea that conservation is an issue
primarily by virtue of its utility for humanity. Thus, South Africa's biodiversity is
accorded moral respect within the understanding that human life derives well-being and
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meaning from it. South Africa's government evokes environmental consciousness and
environmentally friendly practices which, purposefully, are meant to serve various needs
of its citizens. DEAT spells out the central aim behind the conservation of South Africa's
biodiversity:
Over and again, the need to link biodiversity conservation to the needs of South
Africa's people has been highlighted as a major concern, as well as the
importance of integrating conservation into an overall strategy for conserving and
using natural resources sustainably. These concerns have been foremost in
informing the development of this policy (DEAT (a) 1997:7).
What emerges from the above discussions is that sustainability, as it emerges from the
international policy context, is defined by the fact that "human activities such as
pollution, habitat destruction, over-exploitation and foreign plant and animal invasions
are resulting in the ever-increasing loss of the earth's biological wealth [of which] [t]he
implications ... are considerable" (DEAT (a) 1997:1).
It is significant that Canter distinguishes between the "goal of preserving the functions of
ecosystems" (1995:202) and "the duty to protect ecosystems as such" (ibid.). The former
seems to be more in line with utility value of ecosystems than the non-human aspect of it.
Thus, people will preserve an ecosystem because they have a goal which they want to
achieve by doing so. In contrast, "the duty to ... " implies an obligation which inherently
arises from the being of ecosystems. It is the being of an ecosystem's existence that
necessitates humans to safeguard them. In this sense, it can be argued that the duty
presupposes a moral obligation that necessarily has no intention behind it. In this regard,
as already cited above, affIrming the pervasiveness of utilitarian mode of thinking,
Glavovic observes that: "[m]odern conservation strategies are based on a simple
utilitarian philosophical assumption that environmental conservation will produce the
greatest good for the greatest number of people for the greatest period oftime" (1995:45).
In this regard, the utilitarian, duty-based and the stewardship understandings are regarded
as ineffectual because their focus of the "common good" aims at an exclusively human
common good" (Palmer 1997:48). This can be substantiated in the affIrmative statement
of the South African Government which says that "the eradication of poverty; the
- 50-
sustainable development of its economy; and the social development of its people"
(DEAT (b) 1997:3), as its three overriding priorities, in conjunction with the national
environmental policy presently being formulated, "provide the context within which
consideration will be given to achieving the three objectives of the Convention on
Biological Diversity" (ibid.). It is thus the significance of development that has been
recognized on an international level as a prerequisite to human dignity that necessitates
environmental conservation. In other words, the right to development is not only an
expression of human rights but is a fundamental one.
Hence, even though Langa sees the necessity of having "a Constitution which evinces a
consciousness, a sensitivity to saving the environment" (Langa 1996:28), and that people
realise that "the continued well-being of the environment is itself a life and death issue"
(ibid.), the problem is precisely that it is from a Utilitarian and instrumental perspective
that the environment is defined as "a life and death issue". It is different forms of
environmental degradation (such as those cited above) that render sustainability to hold
sway both at international and local levels. Environmental degradation in many forms
tends to define sustainability in the sense that it is humanity's interests and needs that
hold sway in our contemporary environmental consciousness. In this regard,
environmental law and related policies still embody value justifications that human needs
override environmental concerns. Moral concern for the environment is a canopy for
humanity's sustainability of livelihoods. In this regard, what environmental law tries to
discourage and address, in the first instance, are the repercussions of environmental
degradation (as a result of human behaviour) for human purpose for continued well-
being. Thus, two central principles define the Brundtland's concept of sustainable
development: intergenerational equity and intergenerational equity.
This implies that the survival or fate of non-human entities and hence their value, in this
case, is determined from a human perspective. With respect to this understanding, non-
human life systems and nature are only valuable for the very fact that, in whatever way,
they are functional to humans. It follows then that our moral concerns, obligations and
interests for non-human species and the natural environment are informed by, and tend to
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promote "human values and/or human rights" (Taylor 2000:96). This is what is meant by
sustainability in modem political and economic thought. The ethical implication of this is
that non-human life systems and the natural environment are means to attaining human
ends. An anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics has been influential in
environmental laws and related processes, as Palmer comments:
The law - whether statutory or case law - is concerned not with the natural or
living environment in itself but with human use of, and interest in, the
environment. The law, then, reflects the anthropocentric approach to
environmental ethics .. .it does not reflect ... [those] ...values in the environment
unrelated to human use (1997: 113 )(my italics).
It is this fallacious understanding of the environment embodied in some traditional ethical
theories that has led to criticisms against human-oriented approach to environmental
ethics. In the words of Brown (a): "utilitarian and deontological ethics, and more
prominent Western theories of justice, did not make environmental entities the focus of
ethical concern [such that] the emerging environmental crisis became a strong challenge"
(1995:46). As Palmer says by citing America's environmental legislation,
the environment [is] purely a resource for meeting human needs rather than
something that has value in itself. It suggests that, provided means could be
found to meet the needs of present people without damaging the prospects for
future people, environmental protection would not matter (Palmer 1997:93).
From the instrumental value perspective, human beings' relationship to nature IS
perceived only in terms of human utility of the environment. Instrumental value of the
environment has been expressed in economic quantification whereby, generally speaking,
environmental entities suffice the market principle of demand and supply in modem
economies. Humans' relationship to the environment is perceived in terms of material
goods and services the natural environment offers, say, for consumption. In this regard,
Robinson deduces that "[c]onsumption and accumulation of capital are accorded moral
aspect" (1989:43).
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4.4 Local Agenda 21
As already discussed in chapter three, Agenda 21 arose within the international context of
sustainable development adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (known as the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 as "a
comprehensive global action plan to achieve sustainable development" (Durban Metro
2001: 1)(italics original). The need was recognised at Rio that sovereign states, taking into
account unique circumstances within their national boundaries, had to implement
procedures and principles pertaining to sustainable development that were identified at
this Conference. This need gave birth to Local Agenda 21; "the mandate for sustainable
development at the local level" (ibid.).
One of the goals of Local Agenda 21 in line with the 1992 Rio Earth Summit
requirement, and as a thrust of the Brundtland Commission, is to secure the needs of the
yet-unborn while meeting present needs. As a typical expression of inter-generational
equity, Local Agenda 21 's "Concern for the future" requires that "plans and actions
address short and long-term trends and needs and consider the needs of future
generations" (ibid.).
This environmentally ethical demand is explicitly underlined in what could be described
as the key principle of Local Agenda 21: "[e]cological limits - all citizens and
communities must learnt (sic) to live within the Earth's carrying capacity" (Durban Metro
2001 :2). While this statement is environmentally sound, however, this principle is
essentially anthropocentric. The phrase "carrying capacity" is a key to unlocking the
ethical position and value that underlie this principle. The criterion that will determine
sustainability of human survival is the alleviation of human burden on the "carrying
capacity" (Nilrnberger 1999). Hence, its goal is to curtail human behaviour that tends to
undermine the Earth's carrying capacity hence unsustainability. It is social factors such as
over-population, accompanied by economic factors, for instance over-exploitation of
natural resources that are central to this canon. This suggests that concern is directed
towards human survival, not necessarily the environment itself. For example, the moral
obligation of water resources management based on the utility of water: "[f]resh water is
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vital for drinking, sanitation, agriculture, industry, urban development, hydro power
generation, inland fisheries, transportation, recreation and many other human activities
(DEAT 1998:35). Thus the environment is taken into consideration because its demise
will have repercussions on human well-being. To this effect, Engel concludes that
"[a]lmost all of the language of Agenda 21 pertaining to sustainable development and
conservation of biodiversity suggests that the reasons for conserving biodiversity are
derived from the instrumental values and uses that biological resources provide humans"
(1990: 16)(my italics).
4.4.1 GEAR: whose sustainability?
Taking into account the history of South Africa, this country faces a formidable challenge
of addressing the past socio-economic and political ills that enveloped it in the previous
decades. Not least significant is the challenge of addressing the issue of massive poverty
that in the past has stricken mass populations of South Africa. Brown suggests that "[a]s
the 20th century ends, most developed and developing nations assume that a major
function of government, if not the most fundamental and important one, is to provide
citizens with a healthy economy and opportunities for meaningful employment" (Brown
(b) 1995:52).
In general, poverty alleviation is not merely an econorruc Issue but it is equally a
significant ethical issue in that poverty undermines humanity's dignity vis-a-vis human
welfare as entrenched in South Africa's Bill of Rights. This has seen South Africa
adopting macro-economic policies such as GEAR as a means to redress poverty. But
poverty alleviation can only be achieved through utilisation of natural resources. This
implies that resource utilisation is an integral part in the equation of poverty alleviation.
Considering the fact that poverty is regarded as the major cause of environmental
degradation (WCED 1987:3), it becomes politically and ethically justifiable that just as
many governments, South Africa attempts to pursue "sustainable development-related
policies that attempt "to attain both environmental protection and development
objectives" (Brown (b) 1995:53). However, in practice, the potential dilemma arises
when a nation's economic policy such as GEAR, as it will be argued below, "is both
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relevant to development targets and potentially in conflict with environmental protection
goals" (ibid.).
It can safely be argued that environmental concerns are incorporated into GEAR as the
result of "the realization in national governments and multi-lateral institutions that it is
impossible to separate economic development issues from environmental ones" (Ahmed
and Mlay 1998:1). Hence, GEAR is a manifestation of a kind of development that
characterizes sectoral policy changes inclined to more sustainable practices in South
Africa (CENGOPO 1999:10). However, while enormous effort has been made, as GEAR
reflects, the fact is that the instrumental valuation of the environment is ingrained in
humanity. It is this aspect of an anthropocentric view that still pervades policy-making
circles and hence, undermines the ideals of sustainable development. A nuanced thrust
for growth can still be discerned in development/environment strategies. As Connelly and
Smith remark, "[w]here environmental concerns are taken into consideration by
contemporary political institutions, it is common that it is their economic value that is
seen to be significant" (1999:59).
It is this syndrome that, as it will be discussed below, characterises South Africa's
development/environment-related policies and procedures, and which GEAR reflects.
GEAR is an example of a policy that defines our relationship with nature which, as
Redclift would deduce, still endorses progress as a norm (cited in O'Riordan 2000:78).
GEAR takes the form of what Pearce, et al. call the concept of 'weak' sustainable
development; its aim is "to integrate capitalist growth with environmental concerns"
(1989:13), whose objective is economic growth (ibid.). The philosophical underpinnings
underlying GEAR can thus be unravelled by referring to two fundamental dimensions of
this form of sustainability inherent in GEAR. According to Pearce and Warford, on the
one hand, sustainable development means "the sustainable growth of per capita real
incomes over time - the traditional economic growth objective" (1993:9). On the other
hand, sustainability is taken as the sustainable use of resources and the environment. In
the light of this understanding, for Pearce and Warford, the issues are reduced to the
belief that:
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Just as sustainable economic development ... implies some reasonably constant
rate of growth in per capita real incomes, without depleting the nation's capital
stock, so the sustainable use of resources and the environment ... implies some
rate of use of the environment which does not deplete its capital value (ibid.).
South Africa's Bill of Rights shares the ethical problem inherent in predominantly Western
understanding of rights and duties to the non-human entities. Coupled with economic
rationality advocated in public policy, the environmental ideology that Rays discussed in
1972 is ingrained in our environmental consciousness. In the midst of environmental crises,
policy-makers have tended to look up to technology as the means of sustaining economic
growth. Rays characterised the technocentric mode of modem environmentalism as "the
application of rational and 'value-free' scientific and managerial techniques by a
professional elite, who regarded the natural environment as 'neutral stuff from which man
could profitably shape his destiny" (cited in O'Riordan 1981:1). This is an anthropocentric
view that Capra exposes in "shallow ecology" in that "[it] views humans as above or outside
of nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes only instrumental, or 'use', value to nature"
(1996:6). For example, from the perspective of utilitarian ethics, it would be morally
justifiable to destroy an ecosystem so long as it maximises the well-being of people
regardless of the impact the development activity may have on non-human life systems. As
already pointed out, chapter two of South Africa's Constitution, the Bill of Rights, shares
this premise. The conceptual moral framework that the law provides for environment
management is limited to human utility of environment. What emerges from this perception
of reality is a reductionistic and atomistic interpretation of existence.
4.5 Summary
The discussions that emerge from this chapter suggest that varIOUS facets of
environmental legislation and the macro-economic policy of South Africa are flawed.
The characteristics of the "Discontinuity Problem" run through the Bill of Rights. Its
scope of environmental concerns revolves around the concern for human well-being. As
it is central to environmental legislation, philosophical justifications that are entrenched
by environmental law are anthropocentric in nature. Value-judgements that are reflected
in the environmental provisions discussed in this chapter reflect a Utilitarian approach to
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environmental ethics. This is the rationale of the concept of the sustainable development
paradigm embraced in our contemporary institutions and processes. Environmental
concerns are only incorporated into South Africa's environmental legislation essentially
because they affect people. However, the fact that NEMA places obligation on, for
example, developers, it is deontological. In this sense, environmental law necessarily






The previous chapter suggests that our contemporary ecological crises are a result of
mechanistic and reductionistic views of reality informed by social problems manifested
in relations of dominance and subjugation. It is these trends of thought that suffuse
human-nature relationship resulting in different forms of environmental degradation.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss different ecological paradigms which, through
respective conceptual frameworks they presuppose, transcend an anthropocentric
approach to environmental ethics. Suggestions will be made as to how a more
comprehensive ethic can be fostered by using insights that emerge from different
ecological models and principles. This chapter also discusses different agents of change
that have the potential to raise environmental awareness and initiate transformation in
various dimensions of life. The change that is called for with regard to this is the social,
political and economic transformation that is imbued with an inclusive sense of reality.
5.2 The edifying paradigm of social ecology
The recognition that ecological crisis is a result of asymmetrical power relations In
society is central to social ecology. With regard to this, the underlining term here is
"social", and hence social ecology attempts to unravel and trace the roots of ecological
degradation in social settings and relations which are perceived as asymmetrical in
various respects (as will be discussed below). As discussions below will illustrate, the
thrust . behind environmental models that tend to move away from traditional
environmental thought is the "recognition of the often over-looked fact that nearly all our
present ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems" (Bookchin
2000:225). With regard to this observation, "present ecological problems cannot be
clearly understood, much less resolved, without resolutely dealing with problems within
society" (ibid.). A number of ecological models that tend to challenge the nature of the
relationship that is implicitly embodied in environmental law influenced by social forces.
The common denominator that underlies this category of environmental philosophical
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theories (models) is that they tend to deconstruct a perception of reality which depicts
human beings as the only species that command respect. However, it is also important to
mention that there are minor variations in their presuppositions of environmental ethics.
This part discusses three models of environmental ethics, viz. Deep Ecology, the Gaia
hypothesis/the Land Ethic and Ecofeminism.
5.2.1 Deep Ecology
Deep ecology can be regarded as an all-embracing environmental theory that discusses
deeper and holistic view of nature by asking "questions about human life, society, and
Nature" (Devall and Sessions 2000: 149). It posits an inclusive understanding of reality. It
recognizes the world as "a network of phenomena that are fundamentally interconnected
and interdependent" (Capra 1996:7), as opposed to seeing the world "as collection of
isolated objects" (ibid.). It is in this web of life that humanity's place is embedded. This
assumption is informed by the insight that, according to Capra, "[d]eep ecology
recognizes the intrinsic value of all living beings and views humans as just one particular
strand in the web of life" (ibid.). What Capra understands as the "intrinsic value",
however, in the context of this thesis, implies the inherent worth.
Thus, deep ecology is compatible with social ecology in the fact that it radicalizes the
traditionally held view that humans are the pinnacle of creation hence the rest of creation
revolves around them, and is subject to their dominance. Rather, the premise of this
philosophy is that just as any other component of creation, humans are integral part of the
environment and constitute just one aspect of existence and reality. This is the premise of
biocentric equality, "intimately related to the all-inclusive Self-realization in the sense
that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves. There are no boundaries
and everything is interconnected" (Devall and Sessions 2000: 149). This ethic of
interrelatedness and interconnectedness between different aspects of existence, for
example people and animals, prevails in some traditional African societies. For example,
in the eyes of Yoruba, "Freedom and individuality are always balanced by destiny and
community .... Every person is a nexus of interacting elements of the self and the world
which shape and are shaped by his [sic] behaviour" (Ray 1982:132).
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What emerges from this world-view, such as that ofYoruba and Native Americans, is the
reality of the inclusivity of both living and non-living entities. Thus, what becomes
morally acceptable is behaviour or action that tends to promote the stability of a web of
relatedness and interdependence. This is so because, within such a context, what happens
in one sphere of reality will have repercussions on another aspect of reality. Therefore, it
makes sense for the notion of human rights to be understood in the context of a "nexus of
communal relationships" (ibid.). In no way does this fall short of the insights of a systems
approach whereby a variety of different elements "function together as a unit, each
affecting, and in turn affected by, all other elements" (Environment Canada 2000: 1). This
would imply that "sustainability-talk" and practices centre around, and aim to promote
the flourishing of a community of which humans are just one entity. Subsequently, this
further implies that rights would be recognized in terms of the dynamics of communal
life, as what ultimately matters. Expression of rights will be accompanied by moral
obligations that will safeguard the well-being of the entire biotic community. People will
conserve not necessarily because they perceive that their survival is threatened but
because of their fellow beings. As Callicott acknowledges, in this regard,
[W]e may have the germ of an African environmental ethic. Add to the intense
sense of social embeddedness an equally vivid sense of embeddedness in the
biotic community, and anthropocentric African communitarianism might then be
transformed into a non anthropocentric African environmentalism (Callicott
2000:272).
In the light of systems theory, and as it is implied in deep ecology, humans do not exist
separately from aspects of existence be it trees or animals. Re-interpreting the implication
of systems theory in the light of democracy, Murove observes that this will imply that
"human beings have to live in plurality with other things in existence" (1999:85). Hence,
South Africa's Constitution and its relevant environmental provisions (as discussed
above) lack in providing for an environmentally sound ethic that would promote an all-
encompassing reality of existence whereby non-humans are recognised in spite of their
instrumental and intrinsic values. In other words, NEMA presupposes sustainable
development as a goal which is "limited to the fairly shortsighted interests of one species,
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the human species" (Naess 1997:61), as opposed to "the long-term defence of life
conditions on Earth (ibid.).
5.2.2 The Gaia theory/Land ethic
This hypothesis subscribes to a systems approach to reality. As formulated by Aldo
Leopold, Gaia principle presupposes more egalitarian form of existence rather than
regarding man as 'apart from nature' (Attfield 1983:63). The Gaia theory as an
expression of social ecology and indeed, as a system oriented model, lies in the fact that it
"changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain
member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his [sic] fellow-members, and also respect
for the community as such" (Leopold 2000: 140). Its profundity lies in the fact that it
"enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals,
or collectively: the land" (ibid.).
Just as other ethics models discussed in this thesis, a land ethic emphasizes the totality of
existence which embraces different entities. Its focus is on "wholes" as opposed to
individuals. According to a land ethic it is these "wholes", unique in their respective right
that matter most. In other words, it focuses on the "integrity of creation". In terms of
environmental ethics, a land ethic by no means precludes human activities such as
management and use of 'resources' per se, however, "it does affirm their right to
continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural state"
(ibid.). It is important to note here that a land ethic is not anti-development, as the quote
seems to suggest, but it highlights the need for "a limitation on freedom of action in the
struggle for existence" (ibid.). In other words, a morally acceptable behaviour
presupposes a "differentiation of social from anti-social" (ibid.). Anti-social here would
imply behaviour or actions that do not have regard for other members of a community. In
contrast, social behaviour is that which recognizes the diversity of life and promotes it.
5.2.3 Ecofeminism
Amongst any other environmental models discussed in this thesis, Ecofeminism could
perhaps be regarded as revolutionary. Vance projects Ecofeminism as "a sisterly bond, a
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fundamental rejection of all forms of domination, whose necessary goal is diversity rather
than dualism" (cited in Gaard 1993:7). While other theories are equally anti-
anthropocentric, Ecofeminism specifically challenges the patriarchal world-view, that is,
man's superiority over woman, and the implication of this for man-nature relationship.
As a social ecology theory, Ecofeminism relates environmental exploitation and/or
degradation to an uneven power relation, which it likens to men's domination over
women:
human/nature dualism . . . underlies and undermines our relations to the
environment, other people, and that which is embodied and unmediated in
ourselves. One effect of this split is that we understand personal and collective
histories from a culturally ingrained, dualistic perspective. This perspective
perpetuates dynamics that have consistently oppressed women and other
nondominant groups, and exploited nonhuman nature (1993:7).
According to Feminism, it is socially constructed stereotypes that give breadth to the
perceived male superiority over women that have rendered subjugation of women. It is on
this that Ecofeminists builds; the narrow understanding of reality between man and nature
has rendered nature vulnerable to man. Thus, both woman and nature are objectified and
are subsequently raped by man to gratify his needs. Hence, it is against this background
that Ecofeminism "provides a distinctive framework both for reconceiving feminism and
for developing an environmental ethic which takes seriously connections between the
domination of women and the domination of nature" (Warren 2000:213). The dominant
paradigm, which feeds into androcentrism, is dualistic whereby, "[t]he human mind is
subject; all else - including the natural world, and other people - consists of objects, to be
manipulated, therefore dominated, in the interests of the mind's desires" (Plumwood
1994: 160). Another feature of this paradigm is that it is entrenched in instrumental
rationality. This gives rise to understanding reality narrowly. In concise terms, it is
reductionist whereby, for example,
a forest is reduced to commercial wood, and wood is reduced to cellulose fibre
for pulp and paper industry. Forests, land and genetic resources are then
manipulated to increase the production of pulpwood. This distortion is
legitimized scientifically as overall productivity increase, regardless of whether it
might decrease the output of water from the forest, or destroy the diversity of
lifeforms that constitute a forest community (Shiva (a) 1993:25).
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In relation to this, persuasive arguments have been raised as to how patriarchy similarly
reduces the female body to sex-object. Just as a forest is reduced to wood and wood to
fibre, so too is a woman's body reduced to breasts and buttocks, and thence to sex object.
Ecofeminists argue that, just as the dominant ideology constructs a dualistic framework
between human beings and nature, so it does in portraying gender relationships, that is,
between male and female. To sum up, just as nature is perceived as an object of
exploitation and abuse, so too are women.
To counter such an androcentric bias, Ecofeminists advocate a perception of reality that
values the significance of diversity other than reductionist portrayal of reality;
"biodiversity is a web of relationships which ensures balance and sustainability [of those
relationships]" (Shiva (b) 1993:171). Within this paradigm, diversity is a strength rather
than a complication. It follows then that the moral framework that emerges is that of
embracing and nourishing diversity, which in turn, constitutes a web of life. From a
sustainability perspective, for example, biodiversity in sustainable agricultural systems
implies "co-existence and interdependence of trees, crops and livestock, which maintains
cycles of fertility through biomass flows" (ibid.). An ethic that arises from this paradigm
is an ethic that endorses the richness of life that flows from diversity as opposed to "1-
thou" mode of relationships. To put it differently, the ethical implication of this is that
understanding reality should be integralist where all aspects of creation are regarded to
form the web of life as opposed to a truncated view.
5.3 Towards a social ecology paradigm
To a large extent, humanity's consciousness has largely been "colonised" by occidental
scientific thinking as far as traditional theories discussed above suggest. A rights-based
ethics is one example that reflects Western oriented thinking and has pervaded
environmental policy-making. This ethical approach is preoccupied with setting limits as
to what is morally considerable or not, or, what entity enjoys moral standing or not. This
fashion of thinking promotes an anthropocentric and utilitarian view of ethics. Denying
other entities rights ideologically creates a buffer for justifying the utilitarian and
anthropocentric view of ethics. This is not to say, for example, that the notion of rights is
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unimportant in an ethical discourse. But the point is that the people's preoccupation with,
for example the notion of rights, handicaps humans to go beyond what is perceived to be
persons, on the one hand, and on the other hand, what "human-in-existence" or kinship is.
"Human-in-existence" points to the moral framework that presupposes humans only
constitute one dimension of creation, and that their place in the cosmos is determined in
relation to their co-existence with and relatedness to other entities. However, as the
Discontinuity Problem suggests, being a human being is understood in opposition to or
against nature (Plumwood 1994:147). This is an anthropocentric view that Capra exposes
in "shallow ecology", in that, as already cited above, it "views humans as above or
outside of nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes only instrumental, or 'use',
value to nature" (1996:6).
According to Murove, the ethical constraint inherent in this framework is that it "cannot
enable us capture our relatedness with the environment" (1999:81). Hence, in order to
understand our contemporary environmental crises comprehensively, humanity has to
probe into the nature of perceptions that are embodied by and that undergird our various
systems and institutions that reinforce relationships between and amongst humans and
between humans and non-humans (including nature). As already discussed above, to
regard socio-economic factors such as poverty and increased populations as the main
contributing factors to environmental degradation would be turning a blind eye to the root
cause of environmental problems and hence, an understatement. Various forms of
environmental crises we face today find their roots in the perception of reality that is
purely anthropocentric in nature. As conceptual tools such as the Discontinuity Problem
discussed above highlights, environmental decay is as a result of mechanistic and
reductionistic view of reality which inherently lacks an understanding of "our nature and
destiny as a species ... in relationship" (Berry cited in Bell 2001: 15)(italics original). It is
this flawed perception of reality that permeates varied institutional systems and
mechanisms be it social, economic and political spheres.
5.3.1 Transcending anthropocentric environmental ethics
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I This thesis recognises that anthropocentricism embodied in various spheres of human
institutions and systems is the fundamental problem for promoting an environmentally
sound ethic. It is the contention of this thesis that unless the "Discontinuity Problem" is
deconstructed and overcome and, instead, we appreciate that humanity constitute one part
of the whole reality, our various attempts to achieve the goals of sustainability will only
be palliative. To put it succinctly, unless individual human beings re-appreciate their
place in the cosmos as constituting only one dimension of creation, and that they have a
moral obligation towards promoting the "common good" of nature, environmental laws
and hence sustainability will be ineffective to achieve a holistic goal. Philosophically, this
implies that ecologically flawed statements such as; 'Our message, is, above all, directed
towards people, whose well-being is the ultimate goal of all environment and
development policies' (WCED 1987:xiv), needs to be revisited and reconstructed. Such
"-
dogmatic statements elevating humans as the central focus of environmental
conservation, and hence human superiority over non-human entities are embedded in
traditional philosophical theories which project nature as merely of either instrumental
value or intrinsic value as opposed to having inherent worth. This ingrained
misconception manifests in, and is reinforced by a dominant growth-driven economic
theory which regards environmental entities merely as "resources" for human
exploitation and consumption. Shiva (a) comments:
Commercial capitalism is based on specialized commodity production and
therefore demands uniformity in production, and the urn-functional use of natural
resources. Reductionism thus reduces complex ecosystems to a single
component, and a single component to a single function. Further, it allows for the
manipulation of ecosystems in a way that maximizes the single-function
(1993:24-25).
The inherent interpretation of rights in the political thought, as it has been argued about
the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution, is only applicable and limited to the
interests of humans. Such limited interpretation tends to justify interests of humans to
flourish while those ofnon-human entities are regarded as secondary. It reduces a holistic
understanding of how ethically wrong are repercussions of human activities vis-a-vis a
wider environment. There are other entities such as plants that are not covered in our use
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of language. This limitation is significant in the sense that it may render some entities as
having no moral relevance that would demand an ecological ethics on the part of humans.
The inherent problem in the Western scientific and reductionistic thinking which is
preoccupied with setting limits as to what is morally considerable or not, or what entity
enjoys moral standing or not, is that it promotes an anthropocentric and utilitarian view of
ethics. The notion of human rights is one example that in the process has tended to
elevate humanity's interests, needs and preferences to the detriment of other entities of
the cosmos. The idea of separating humans from nature is axiomatic to our modem view
of reality, and economics not being an exception. Cobb observes:
[T]he narrow limits within which the ecological consciousness has become
effective express very deep-seated features of our Western mode of thinking. We
think of what is most real as individual, physical entities, more or less self-
contained, and only secondarily entering into relations with other entities ....
Newtonian science and laissez-faire economics are both expressive of this sense
of reality" (1980:442).
Cobb further argues that "[t]he limitations of our anthropocentric norms appear when we
speak about the value of other animal species [as contrasted with humans]. In economics
that question can only mean the value of other species to human beings" (1980:447). The
traditional tendency of ascribing rights to entities based on criteria (which in the end
warrants their entitlement only to humans) to a large extent cripples our ethical thinking
and practices. Within the moral framework of human jurisprudence which asserts human
rights, it is the reasoning that humans are inherently endowed with dignity and respect
that justifies the claim that "[w]e should never treat a person as a mere thing to be used
for our own purposes and intentions" (ibid.). As cited earlier, the inherent worth
embodied in human jurisprudence implies that humans treat other humans as "ends and
never simply as means, or as subjects and never simply as objects (cited in Des Jardins
1993:34).
This fundamental duty presupposes reciprocity on the part of humanity, and it informs the
philosophicaVlegal basis to the notion of rights. In essence, within environmental ethics,-
the notion of rights distinguishes deontological approaches from utilitarian and
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stewardship approaches and hence allows for an ethic that justifies treating entities with
respect for inherently what they are. However, rather than promoting a holistic
environmental ethic whereby all life systems (not to mention the natural environment) are
protected and enhanced, the rights-based approach is insular in that it zeroes in on one
aspect of the environment; that is, humans. Understanding of this sort tends to undermine
complexity of relationships in the cosmos. According to Murove, the ethical constraint
inherent in the perception of reality that this framework postulates is that it "cannot
enable us to capture our relatedness with the environment" (1999:81). This is not to say,
for example, that the notion of rights is unimportant in an ethical discourse. But the point
is that the humans' preoccupation with, for example the notion of rights, handicaps
humanity to go beyond what is perceived to be human, on the one hand, and on the other
hand, what it is to be "human-in-existence" or to possess kinship. In the light of what
Plumwood calls the "Discontinuity Problem", the former is understood as in opposition
to or against nature (1994:147). An anthropocentric understanding of right-based ethics is
ethically flawed in that it serves the purpose of particular species, and hence is suspect in
the light of an "Earth Jurisprudence" environmental ethic. On the contrary, as Cobb
argues, "[t]he interconnectedness of things crosses all the lines of demarcation
established by [various human institutions and systems]. Each of these investigates that
aspect of the whole sphere of organic relations amenable to its methods and grasped by
its concepts" (1980:443), and each is reinforced by its accompanying prejudices.
Although the rationale behind NEMA is to promote a form of "environmental
citizenship" on the part of developers through, for example, the principles of the "Polluter
Pays" (PPP) and Duty of Care (DoC), its constraint still lies in the fact that it still
subscribes to environmental values which are contingent on human interests and needs
vis-a-vis the environment. As already shown in the previous chapter, the moral obligation
embodied in NEMA is intended to sustain human life and systems to the detriment of
non-human life systems. As already exemplified above, the omission of the environment
as "An Affected Party" is an act of omission on the part of policy makers; it is ethically
questionable in light of the holistic understanding of the concept of "earth community".
Indeed, in most instances, it is the environment that gets affected most in pursuing
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development projects yet NEMA does not suggest this. Utilitarian, and hence
anthropocentric ethics is the main drive behind developmentJenvironment- related tools
such as IBM which requires that "positive aspects of the development be maximised and
the environmental costs minimised so as to ensure that the cost to society is outweighed
by the benefits to society" (Ridl 1994:74). This implies that so long as development
activities offer "common good" to society, that is, human society, it is morally justifiable
to disrupt natural systems. The implication is that developers will comply with NEMA's
principles and go ahead with their projects presupposedly to avoid punitive measures
rather than because they recognise and respect inherent worth of say, an ecosystem.
Within the understanding of the concept of "environmental citizenship", this can be
regarded as "shallow environmental citizenship" that adheres to social and economic
forces. Lemons picks up on this issue as he observes:
--I
nonhumans are not represented at all, yet the effects of climate change on the ::
nonhuman environment may be even greater than on humans.... Despite the intensity
of these impacts, nonhuman nature is completely without representation in our
decision processes. It must depend entirely on the preferences of human sympathiz~rs~
for support (Lemons et al. 1995:130).
Protecting nature merely for the sake of its utility is not edifying for environmental ethics as
Canter exposes this weakness inherent in Western ethical paradigms:
[p]rotecting ecosystems without regard to their use to humans, however, is a goal
not necessarily supported by Western ethical systems. A person operating within
a Western anthropocentric ethical framework might value an ecosystem highly
but feel no obligation to protect it (Canter, et al. 1995:202).
The ethical implication of a market economy, which responds to the whims of ever-
wanting laws of demand and supply (which are typical utilitarian justifications) not only
disrupts the ontological rhythm of relationships across components of the cosmos of
which humans are part but also stresses the carrying capacity of natural resource bases.
The cosmos has negatively responded to intense human economic activities. These
include global warming and extinction of species.
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Although the paradigm of sustainable development has in human history been held as -
significant in articulating the intrinsic connection between environment and development,
however, it falls short of an ethic that promotes the inclusive reality; it is growth-oriented.
Though core ideals of sustainable development are incorporated in policy-making, the ~
ultimate aim is to gratify human interests. As far as policy issues pertaining to sustainable
development are concerned, it is not resource sustainability that is promoted but human
survival. In other words, the latter informs the former. Whether sustainable development
is invoked as a feature moral obligation or simply because of the perceived mutual
interdependency of development and environment, human utility of the environment still
remains the main objective. The concept of sustainable development is human oriented;
I ~
its thrust is embedded in the dogma that growth is indispensable.
In political and economic thought processes and institutions, sustainable development is
based on the assumption that the natural resource base is resilient. This view of the non-
depreciation of the natural resource stock is characterized in sentiments of optimism and
determination: "[i]fneeds are to be met on a sustainable basis the Earth's natural resource
base must be conserved and enhanced" (WeED 1987:57). In the same vein, as already
quoted above, IUCN is explicit about the goal for conservation; "[to] yield the greatest
sustainable benefit" within and across generations (cited in Adams 1992:209). This
version of maximizing output for the greatest numbers for people has led to the currency
of the term oxymoron in the sense that "sustainable development is economic growth
achieved by economic efficiency within a system, subject to constancy of the natural
capital stock - that is, the stock of environmental assets is held constant while the
economy is allowed whatever social goals are deemed appropriate" (Baker, et al.
1997:13). As a legitimating conceptual paradigm, it could be said that sustainable
development is meant "to rehabilitate a largely discredited concept [of growth] by giving
it a spiritual boost that it would be in a bad taste to refuse" (Rist 1999:95)(italics
original). Otherwise, the thrust of this form of development is still Utilitarian and hence
prescribes to human sustainability. In the Brundtland Report the environment is regarded
as a resource. In line with this view, what only needs to be done is to determine how this
resource base can be stabilized. It is undeniably the perceived connection between
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environment and development, in environment policy-making, that is given the guise of
moral obligation. This need for satisfying human needs through the sustainability of the
natural resource base is given moral expression in policy-making processes and
structures.
In contrast, this thesis suggests that unless humans come to grips with a holistic view of1
existence, sustainability will be an illusion. The main objective of sustainability should be
to enhance the integrity of all life forms. This is a call for a change of perception on part I
of humanity as a species, not only because it shares existence with other beings but, more .
significantly, because people have enormous capacities that can be used to promote well-
being of the "earth community". This is the bottom line that undergirds the concept of_
"environmental citizenship." It entails
more than just 'buying green' and recycling at the office; it involves
environmentally responsible decision making in everything we do. This means
caring for the environment when we are acting as members of communities or
organizations, as well as when we are acting just as individuals. In other words,
we can think of individuals, communities, and organization as all being potential
environmental citizens" (Environment Canada 2001:1).
A call for "environmental citizenship" is edifying considering that environmental law
reflects human-nature relatedness in terms of costs and benefits that come into play in
this relationship, and are determined from, at least hitherto, corrupt human perception of
reality which elevates human values. Environment Canada describes citizenship as
"about recognizing one's membership in the community of all living things, and
acknowledging responsibilities toward this community" (2001 :7). From a different
perspective, Bookchin shares this sentiment: "[s]ocial ecology is an appeal not only for
moral regeneration but also, and above all, for social reconstruction along ecological
lines" (2000:226). What this implies is that as opposed to being mere members of an
"Earth community", humans must take an active stand to rethink about their role in
matters concerning the environment of which they are part. This is significant in South
Africa as the country is on a pilgrimage of reconstruction. Social ecology and
"environmental citizenship" pose a challenge for the reconstruction of a world-view with
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regard to human-nature relationship. By and large, this arises from the idea that the
"primary right and responsibility of the citizen is to participate actively in the life of the
community" (Environmental Canada 2001 :6). This is a significant point in that it
accentuates that an individual's citizenship is defined in relation to the life of a
community. In this regard, it is safe to believe that in such a context, a citizen's behaviour
and actions are supposed to be in sync with the rhythm or fabric of his/her/its community.
Hence, taken together, "environmental citizenship" is the shorthand term that describes
"the ethical obligations that link us with other members of the biosphere" (Environment
Canada 2001 :7). Further, Environment Canada spells out the parallel between
environmental citizenship and the concept of ecosystems: "an understanding of the
ecosystem perspective is essential for environmental citizenship, while active
environmental citizenship reinforces the holistic approach required by the ecosystem
approach" (2001: 1). According to Potter, "[e]nlightened anthropocentricism calls for
long-term survival [and] the long-term survival of species diversity" (cited in Connelly
and Smith 1999:229).
Hence, as a form of moral extensionism, which simply can be regarded as expanding our
moral horizon, an "Earth Jurisprudence" as an alternative model of environmental ethics
provides a framework that is holistic by not only going beyond species-based notion of
rights, but by regarding the non-human world as equally having rights. According to this
ethic, "[e]very component of the Earth community has three rights. The right to be, the
right to habitat, and the right to fulfill its role in the ever-renewing process of the Earth
community" (Bell 2001 :7). The implication of the idea of "human-in-existence" is that
humanity's existence is "a shared existence with the natural environment, we belong
together. Our well-being and the well-being of the environment cannot be separated from
each other" (ibid.).
The perception of life in this fashion challenges the utilitarian and instrumental view of
the environment entrenched in Western dominant ethical theories. Rather than drawing a
clear-cut line between our place as humans in the universe and the natural environment,
there is a need for the resurgence of an ethic that promotes democratic freedoms while
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checking the potential effects that might spin off from such values. An "Earth
Jurisprudence" ethic is enlightening in terms of relationship between humans and their
environment. This thesis suggests that for the goals of sustainability to be achieved, an
ethic of egalitarianism needs to inform our moral frameworks, whereby, as Kothari
suggests:
Respect for life has to be a fundamentally spiritual notion, based on faith in the
inalienable rights of all living beings. The basic sanctions behind them are not
contractual but transcendental. They are not primarily claims bestowed by law
but are inherent in the very nature oflife (Kothari 1990:33).
Against the general moral framework that the above moral models, one can generally say
that South Africa's environmental legislation is inherently constrained to provide a
holistic ethic for sustainability. This thesis contends that NEMA, as an overarching
legislation that aims to promote sustainability, suspiciously embodies a hierarchical form
of relationships between human beings and the environment. It is thus compelling that a
holistic ethical paradigm should be sought so as to offset the above highlighted
constraints in moral frameworks regarding human and nature relationship. In order to
provide for an alternative conceptual framework for a more holistic environmental ethics,
and hence sustainability, recourse will be sought in Bell's paradigm of an "Earth
Jurisprudence".
5.3.2 Towards a holistic perspective of environmental ethics
There has been an increasingly interesting debate about how environmental ethics can be
holistic and hence effective. This has led to a paradigm shift in the interpretation of
rights. The notion of animal rights is a classical example of the need to enlarge our moral
concern. Advocacy for animal rights has been the result of various morally repugnant
tortures and treatment to which animals have been subjected. However, with the
progressive trend of ecological consciousness, intense need has emerged for humans to
enlarge their moral concern to the non-animal domain. The idea is not to object to the
idea that humans are unique in their own way, but from ethical and legal perspectives the
rationale is to dilute a dimension of anthropocentricism inherent in human rights and




Juxtaposing an "Earth Jurisprudence" ethic with Leopold's "land ethic", Bell suggests
that human rights need to be complemented by an ecological ethic that, as already cited
above, limits: "freedom of action in the struggle for existence" (2001 :27). In
philosophical terms, human rights need to be an expression of "a differentiation of social
from anti-social conduct"(ibid.). As moral agents capable of making rational, moral
judgments, and as the Rule of Nonmaleficence suggests, humanity has "the duty not to
kill an organism and not to destroy a species-population or biotic community, as well as
to refrain from any action that would be seriously detrimental to the good of an organism,
species-population, or life community" (Taylor 1994:87).
The paradigm of an "Earth Jurisprudence" is non-anthropocentric and hence ethically
enlightening in the sense that it fosters a morality that can bridge the perceived gap
between humans and animals. To put it differently, an ethic of "Earth Jurisprudence"
tends to ch~llenge the human tendency of perceiving non-humans simply in terms of their
instrumental value. It bases its argument for moral concern on transcendence. The moral
imperative for moral concern for other beings other than humans is given breadth in an
"Earth Jurisprudence."
5.3.2.1 An "Earth Jurisprudence", the philosophy of ubuntu and environmental
ethics
Sustainability ultimately rests on the democracy of all life, on the recognition that human
beings are not masters but members of the Earth family (Kothari 1990:32).
Building on the insights of an "Earth Jurisprudence", it would be required that policy-
making processes entail that utilitarian and deontological ethical theories and other moral
principles be informed by a holistic insight into existence as presupposed in ecological
models discussed in this chapter. This not a revolutionary call whereby humanity would
need abandon all "its activities, knowledge, and institutional structures, or surrender all
its achievement and start all over again in a clean, new state" (Kothari 1990:33); it is
rather a call for evolution. In other words; "our view of which values and purposes should
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infonn our actions and institutions must be consciously re-viewed; and, where choices
are called for, these should be exercised" (Kothari 1990:33). Thus, the idea is to
encourage a symbiotic culture through which inherent worth of a biotic community is
respected and promoted. According to Taylor, this can only be achieved by adopting an
"ultimate moral attitude" towards non-human species in order to "maintain a healthy
existence in a natural state" (2000:96). In this sense, the principles of the "ultimate moral
attitude" and "equal consideration of interest" call for a shift from categorically elevating
instrumental values of non-human species to valuing them essentially for their inherent
worth. In tenns of species relatedness, it implies that human beings have to move away
from speciesism, which Singer defmes as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the
interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other
species" (2000:54). In one sense, to expand the horizon of moral community, conditions
attached to the entitlement of "rights" have to be redefined free from an anthropocentric
view of environmental ethics. As Attfield reasons, this implies, nonetheless, that
the peculiar value of the fulfilment of characteristic human capacities can be
granted without denying the possibility of rights on the part of nonhuman
animals .... Nor can it be necessary for an environmental ethic to be committed
to treating species-boundaries in themselves as a proper basis for discrimination
and differential treatment (1983 :62)(italics original).
Cobb echoes the need for embracing a more edifying anthropocentricism in policy-
related spheres because, for example, biocentricism can act as "a check on the
shortsightedness of most policies proposed from anthropocentric motives - a check that is
needed also from the perspective of enlightened anthropocentricism (1980:448). Thus, as
an alternative environmental approach to ethics, an "Earth Jurisprudence" affinns the
integrity of the entire creation. It is compatible with biocentric ethics because it basically
legitimizes the flourishing of all life systems in the universe. The contention that runs
through a life-centred theory is that the environment should be protected not simply
because of its utilitarian purpose to humanity but, essentially, because of its inherent
worth. In the light of this, humans have prima facie moral obligations that are owed to
non-human life systems essentially because they are integral to the Earth's biocentric
community (Taylor 2000:96).
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In the same vein, the philosophy of an "Earth Jurisprudence" should equally be brought
to the centre stage to illuminate the interrelatedness and interdependence that exist
between human and non-human species. This model is in essence compatible with the
holistic principle of person-in community. Even though it has been argued that the animal
rights talk is merely for political convenience sake (Singer 2000:55), the rights-based
ethics can be revisited and be seen in a new light. This thesis suggests that the essence of
an "Earth Jurisprudence" needs to inform an inclusive view of human reality which
Prozesky evokes for South Africa:
A position which offers an inclusive picture of human reality, which implies that
humans are essentially valuing beings, which insists that the natural and social
environment are essential to the very meaning of humanity, let alone to the practical
business of living worthily and well, and which assigns such a marked centrality
without also encouraging selfish, egocentric patterns of existence, is manifestly one
that has very great relevance to the situation in South Africa and indeed to the wider
world. It deserves to be much more widely known than it is, and its educational,
economic, ecological and political implications need to be much more fully explored
in South Africa (1995:58).
From an environmental ethics perspective, an "Earth Jurisprudence" ethic entails
"interconnected totality, with nothing actual being capable of existing in detachment or
isolation from everything else" (Prozesky 1995:55). In this way it transcends the legal
language of human rights that distorts the ethical implications of our relationships to
nature. "Environmental redemption" can be sought in philosophical underpinnings of an
"Earth Jurisprudence" ethics. It is by utilising wisdom inherent in African traditions that
South Africa (and Africa as a whole) can capture the broader reality of existence, and
thereby challenge the atomistic view of reality. In this regard, the objective of sustainable
development should be to promote the well-being of all the entities in existence. It
denotes the acknowledgement of interdependence and interrelatedness that exist between
entities. In this way, it could be said that an "Earth Jurisprudence" inculcates the morality
that promotes the well-being of different entities, essentially as a result of relatedness and
interdependence, as opposed to categorically perceiving humans as apart from or outside
nature. Thus, humans will have duty to care for the environment essentially because they
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do not exist in isolation, but essentially because their existence is shaped and affected by
other entities, and vice versa. The philosophy of ubuntu alludes to the idea that humans
form part and are part of nature. The implication of this philosophy is that humanity's
existence is "a shared existence with the natural environment, we belong together. Our
well-being and the well-being of the environment cannot be separated from each other"
(Murove 1999:85). This perception of existence is thus compatible with deep ecology or
Gaia theory in the sense that both environmental ethical theories are community-oriented
or holistic in approach; they recognise inter-relatedness of and inter-dependences
amongst species.
An "Earth perspective" school of thought presupposes that the circle of moral concern
needs to be extended to embrace non-humans even though they do not constitute a moral
community but because they have inherent worth. To this effect, the argument goes,
humans have a duty to treat non-human entities as ends themselves not simply as means
but because they have inherent worth. This affirmation of inherent worth is in line with a
theistic worldview. It is reasoned that it is a deity or a creator who accords the inherent
worth of an entity. This implies that the inherent worth of an entity is independent of its
any relevant use. Any form of existence has inherent worth by virtue of its being. In this
case, the "good" of a thing derives from its being.
Rights in this regard are understood in the sense that different constituents of the "earth
community" have relationships toward each other. It is the form of relationships of
interdependence and interrelatedness that an "Earth Jurisprudence" presupposes that
gives expression to these rights. The mutuality of harmonious relationships determines
how these rights can be of help to reinforce the coexistence of various entities that form a
single community. To put it differently, from this perspective, rights would act as a lever
strengthening, rather than disrupting the stability and integrity of this form of existence.
This implies that "[h]uman rights do not cancel out the rights of other modes of being to
exist in their natural state" (Bell 2001: 17). In the light of this, it will be argued that rights
theory does not necessarily disregard human utility of animals; however, it challenges the
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perception that the environment is only of instrumental value: they deserve moral concern
essentially for what they are.
Perhaps, the plausibility of this notion can be better captured in the tradition-oriented
world-view of reality of existence. For example, citing the African world-view of
reality Mbiti writes:
[F]or African peoples, this is a religious universe. Nature in the broadest sense of
the word is not an impersonal object or phenomenon: it is filled with religious
significance. Man [sic] gives life even where natural objects and phenomena
have no biological life" (Mbiti 1969:56).
It is crucially important to understand that, as Mbiti indicates, Africans' perception of
nature is embedded in their religious and hence, public domain. It implies that nature
is not merely regarded as a resource receptacle hence impersonal. Rather it forms part
of their religious (and spiritual) being. Hence, the phrase "man gives life" is, in its
own right, significant for environmental ethics; it points to an ethic of care and awe.
It presupposes an ethic of care that is transcendent; not based on contractual
understanding of relationships, but essentially based on experiential reality endowed
with spiritual dimension or essence. In this regard, humans cannot extricate
themselves from this embedded existence. Here, it is presumed that it is expected of
"man" to protect and promote the well-being of nature that determines hislher
destiny. This is manifested in the attitude "fully illustrated by the way they 'read'
God into various objects and phenomena" (Mbiti 1969:51).
The same can be said about non-human life systems as President Nelson Mandela's
statement seems to suggest as he says: "Each one of us is intimately attached to the
soil of this beautiful country. Each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we
feel a sense of personal renewal" (DEAT (a) 1997:4). Although the preceding quote
might not necessarily be environmentally informed, however, in the midst of the need
for moral regeneration in South Africa, such rhetorical statements need to be re-
appropriated in public policy discourses and be regarded as a litmus for our
commitment to moral revival in the wider application of this need.
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In the same vein, unlike in the reductionistic-mindset worldview, perhaps another
appealing feature of African traditions is that the identity of humans is identified with
that of animals as the totemic system seems to suggest. By implication, there exists a
bond between humans and non-humans. According to the totemic tradition, "the
totemic animal is related to people in the sense that it preserves the memory of their
identity as to who they are, where they come from" (Murove 1999:22). This
subsequently rendered animals as sacred in the sense that special respect was shown
by not selling a totemic animal, not using it "for food or other utilitarian purposes
which would make it subservient to the individual members of society. We can say
that while other things might be said to be possessed, the totem is the subject of
predication by direct identity" (ibid.).
The ethical implication of the inclusive view of reality supersedes an understanding
of (totemic) animals merely in terms of their instrumental value. Rather, African
totemic philosophy implies human-animal relatedness by virtue of being which
further subsumes their utility to humans. In this case, one would not talk of animal
rights (assuming that this language would exist in the African traditional context)
without realising its implications for human beings. Such a holistic perception of
reality resonates with other non-African, but equally traditional world-views. For
example, Kothari cites the women of Gharwal, the backbone of the Chipko
movement, who "risked their lives to save their trees, though anthropocentric, clearly
believe that trees have rights, and that the rights of trees are of a higher order than
those of human beings. This is because, it is argued, trees provide the conditions for
life on Earth" (Kothari 1990:32). Surely, this understanding of human-nature
relationship surpasses the legal and contractual interpretation of morality.
As opposed to a world-view that is reductionistic and mechanistic, the frame of mind of
this nature presupposes a more inclusive ethic that is integralist and embraces other
realities of existence. It posits that everything in existence is of inherent worth. It
basically suggests that the environment should be protected not simply because of its
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utilitarian purpose to humanity but, essentially, because of its inherent worth. An ethic
that is embodied in this world-view reflects, as already cited in chapter three, what Taylor
calls "ultimate moral attitude" which presupposes that human beings have prima facie
moral obligations that are owed to non-human life systems essentially because they are
integral to the Earth's biocentric community (2000:96).
While the philosophy of ubuntu etymologically presupposes human domain of
relationships and could be said thus anthropocentric, however, its interpretation can be
enlightening for environmental ethics. Mbiti seems to suggest that the inclusive
understanding of reality in the traditional African life is characterised by "corporate
morality, customs and traditional solidarity" (1969:214). As the above quote suggests,
ubuntu would provide a moral framework that is all-encompassing. Within this
framework, it is a type of morality that would recognise the essence of communality, and
that which would enhance solidarity defined in the context of communality that surpasses
the conventional understanding of ubuntu. It would rather imply that existence-in-
relationships goes beyond human relationships. The environment in many dimensions
shapes human life. Thus, according to this version of ubuntu, being human implies living
in accordance with, in general terms, the ideals that tend to safeguard and promote
relationships of co-existence. In this regard, relationships would encompass those
amongst humans and between humans and nature. The ethical implication of the wisdom
that undergirds this philosophy is that humans ought to be morally conscious of their
place in the cosmos vis-a.-vis non-humans. In this context, the language of rights does not
come first, it is rather, the harmonious relationship between humans and the environment
that is fostered. In this context, it can be argued, environmental ethics about human-
nature relationship is based on the intimacy of their existence. A holistic understanding of
reality in this manner is supported by Whiteheadean process thought; "reality is a single
continuum admitting of no fundamental ontological divisions" (Prozesky 1995:55).
To interpret reality of existence in a mechanistic and reductionistic manner will be
undermining the ethical implication of such a world-view. It is such a mentality that has
in the fust place created environmental problems. In sum, it is this mechanistic way of
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thinking that led Mbiti to challenge non-African writers about Africans' rich
understanding of nature: "[i]t is unfortunate that foreign writers, through great ignorance,
have failed to understand this deep religious insight of our peoples; and have often
ridiculed it, or naively presented it as 'nature worship' or 'animism' " (Mbiti 1969:56).
5.3.2.1.1 A Bill of Rights for The Planet Earth
As already mentioned, within the moral framework of an "Earth Jurisprudence", and in
light of the above ecological models, it implies that the language of rights is transcended
and replaced with a notion of rights that arises out of the recognition of being of non-
humans. According to Kothari, "[t]he basic sanctions behind them are not contractual but
transcendental. They are not primarily claims bestowed by law but are inherent in the
very nature oflife" (1990:33).
The inclusive understanding of reality embedded in an "Earth Jurisprudence" is
compatible with ecological theories discusses above. The type of morality embodied in
.such ecological models challenges the "species-based" ethics which emphasises the well-
being of an individual. For instance, with an "individualist" approach, it would not be
justifiable to morally cull an individual animal for the greater good of the species/herd. In
contrast, rather than giving weight to one species, ecological theories discussed above
highlight the significance of promoting a web of life. This comprehensive approach to
ethics provides a broader understanding in terms of relationship between humans and
their environment. Boff claims:
Ethics means ... responsibility for everything that exists and lives.... [Yet], [t]he
dominant ethics of present-day society is utilitarian and anthropocentric. It denies
... the intrinsic value of certain other living creatures in nature. It does not
understand that rights do not belong only to humankind and to nations, but also to
other beings in creation. There is a human and social right, but there is also an
ecological right (1991 :30)(my italics).
The articulation of ethics in this manner is thus compatible with an "Earth Jurisprudence"
advocated by Environment Canada. As one alternative approach to environmental ethics,
an "Earth Jurisprudence" presupposes a new epistemology which recognises that the
Earth and its well-being is fundamental and that the well-being of humanity is derivative
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as opposed to indicative (Bell 2001: 15). This way, it challenges our fonn of human
jurisprudence which sees "ourselves as being at the top of a pyramid of species, calling
the shots, and acting in our own best interests. Other species have no rights" (2001 :22).
Its point of departure is that "the Earth and its species are not a collection ofobjects but
are, rather, a communion of subjects" (cited in Bell 2001:14)(italics original). In this
sense, humans are morally obliged to respect and promote the natural environment
essentially by virtue of its existence. In other words, all human actions should be assessed
in the light of whether such acts promote or degrade the existence of creation in its
entirety. The fundamental idea here is to embrace the attitude of humility with respect to
understanding our place in nature vis-a-vis other entities. This is the philosophical
assumption that underlies Boff s (1991) reasoning of an ecological right. Thus, to move
away from a human jurisprudence that is impregnated with human biases, there is need
for a paradigm shift that "humans [ought to] redefine our role as a species and reintegrate
ourselves within an integrated community of species" (Bell 2001 :22). Moreover, Judge
Douglas confmns that "[b]y conferring legal rights on natural objects we give a voice to
inarticulate creatures" (cited in Palmer 1997:119).
It is in line with the above insights that this thesis deems Bell's insights of rights edifying
for South Africa's Constitution in articulating environmental law. Hence, if the objective
of sustainable development is to be achieved, environmental laws/policies must embrace
non-market values of the environment. Hodgson argues that a "government committed to
the protection of the natural environment must campaign on the basis of moral
imperatives such as duty and compassion, involving concern for animals and succeeding
generations of humans, and not simply a calculus of costs and benefits" (1997:60). In this
regard, interests of non-human entities must be incorporated into environmental laws by
extending "utilitarian and deontological theories to all sentient beings" (Brown (a)
1995:46). The idea is to recognize the "common ground" between "the rights of humans
and the rights of the other than human world.... that the Earth is a one-time gift with
limited carrying capacity and resilience" (Bell 2001 :25). In sum, from an "Earth
jurisprudence" perspective, sustainability would mean embracing an ecocentric
worldview that presupposes morally egalitarian "understanding of the value of different
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forms of life, adopting a holistic approach that recognizes the interrelatedness of all life"
(Baker, et al. 1997:16).
It is in this ethical framework that the claim of human superiority and hence human rights
can be critically discussed. Subsequently, environmental laws need to be imbued with this
deeper epistemology that embodies a holistic perception of existence; based upon a dynamic
and functional cosmological ecology (Berry cited in Bell 2001:15-16). Surely, humanity can
use their unique capacities that can be used to contribute towards the well-being of an "Earth
community". It is the very reason that humans are capable of, for example, seeing and then
judging that necessitates them to act morally. Berry observes:
The dominant characteristic of the human species is our reflective capacity. As
Thomas Berry has noted, "human consciousness is the universe reflecting upon
itself'. This reflective capacity confers upon us certain ethical and moral
responsibilities to care for the planet and the integrated earth community (cited
in Bell 2001: 15-16)(italics original).
What needs to be inculcated in this regard is to promote an "ultimate moral attitude"
towards non-human species in order to "maintain a healthy existence in a natural state"
(Taylor 2000:96). One may argue that within this purview of understanding, the form of
development that is morally acceptable and environmentally feasible is the type of
development that will foster the well-being of both human and non-human entities. In
terms of humanity's livelihood, it implies that the focus should be on basic needs rather
than luxurious needs. Building on Boffs theory of ecodevelopment, Murove suggests
that "development has to foster solidarity among all living things as co-partners to our
human well-being" (1999:183). In other words, in economic language, development
should measure "well-being in terms other than that of annual consumption" (Richardson
1997:48).
5.3.2.1.2 Revisiting the fallacy of neo-Iiberal economic theory
The ethical implications of a "land ethic" challenge the idea implicit in neo-liberal
economics that resources are infinite. The implementation of neo-liberal economics
models places heavy stress on the environment. As already cited above, core objectives
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of sustainable development and GEAR mitigate against the very idea of sustainability. By
no means can a growth-oriented type of economics be sustainable into infinity.
Considering the fact that modem economic structures have borne environmental ills, Boff
advocates that sustainable development should rightly be ecologically oriented.
Ecodevelopment, the term which Boff seemingly prefers to sustainable development,
points to "a form of development that takes the ecological factors into account for the
reason that nature comprises a form of capital along with the means of production and
labour" (1995:22). Economics should go beyond the "international political correctness"
which the concept of sustainable development seems to address. Environmental
principles such as those discussed above, which regards the environment as merely a
resource vitiates the morality embodied in an "Earth Jurisprudence." They mitigate the
ethic of solidarity and belongingness that reinforces a web of life constitutive of
individual species that are unique in their own sense.
To promote sustainability, humans as conSCIOUS beings ought to be "environmental
citizens" who need to consciously challenge the fallacious fundamental epistemology that
nourishes neo-liberal economics. Concomitant to a neo-liberal economic theory are
epistemological presuppositions (Daly and Cobb 1989), which, amongst others, are GNP
and homo economicus. With respect to the former, GNP as an indicator of a healthy
economy and a good market is deficient as far as an understanding of sustainability
espoused in this thesis entails. Not only to mention that GNP does not reflect the complex
dynamics of poverty, illiteracy and effects of economic activities vis-a-vis ecological
communities (Murove 1999:200), its scope of measurement is purely economical and
hence reductionistic. From an anthropocentric view, GNP only measures material well-
being, disregarding spiritual and cultural aspects of life. From an environmental ethics
perspective, its constraint lies in the fact it only reflects an instrumental value of the
environment. In other words, the environment is a commodity whose use is to satisfy
human needs. Thus, as Daly and Cobb say, GNP is a feature of misplaced concreteness
(see also Murove 1999:200). As opposed to reflecting reality in such a reductionistic
manner, Murove argues that "[f]or the GNP to give a true reflection of the well-being of
society and and [sic] the environment, it should be based on the welfare of our common
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existence instead of measuring [only] income" (1999:200). Further, as already mentioned
above, the growth orientation in neo-liberal economic theory raises other ethical issues
such as increased consumption patterns which, in turn, lead to increases in pollution
levels and an increased pressure on the environment. In the same light, the whims of the
economic market, for example, growth of national economies, are still looked up to as
yardsticks for the attainment of the goals of sustainable development. This is to the
disservice of the objective of sustainable development. Connelly and Smith expose this
weakness:
It.. .is far from a suitable measure of environmental sustainability in that growth
usually entails environmental and social degradation. A single accurate measure
of such a complicated objective as sustainable development is unlikely to be
forthcoming and perhaps the best way of responding to such concerns is to
develop broad quality-aI-life indicators to guide policy decisions and other
interventions into the non-human world (1999: 131)(my italics).
According to Murove, this notion presupposes that
a) ... the individual's wants are insatiable and that (b) as individuals acqUire
particular goods, their desire for additional consumption of that good diminishes.
Only commodities consumed by an individual contribute to that individual's
satisfaction or utility function (1999:201).
To understand an idea of "Economic man", as one aspect that neo-liberal economics
feeds into, well explains the reason why modem consumption has become a fetish.
Modem people's consciousness has been colonised through wild advertisements such that
wants (as opposed to needs) have been created. Modem markets have been flooded with
created artificial needs. But goods and services available to modem people on markets
accompany environmental degradation of many forms. On one hand, the environment is
only regarded as a receptacle from which humans can exploit resources and, on the other
hand, as a "sink" which is out there to absorb by-products from consumed goods and
services. All such developments compromise the resilience of nature.
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5.3.2.2 Agents of change
The challenge for raising environmental awareness cuts across a range of societal
spheres. Sustainability is not only about sustainable use of "resources", it touches many
aspects of life. It is a social/cultural issue, a political issue and needless to mention, an
economic issue. We cannot talk of sustainable development only in economic respect
without considering its social and political implications. To this effect, for sustainability
to be effective, concerted effort has to emanate from different spheres of life or
disciplines. In his book Prosperity, Poverty and Pollution, using the insights of Korten,
Nurnberger discusses agents of change which command "the full range of levels of
competence" (1999:361). This thesis will now turn to focus on selected agents of change
which, in spite of their respective constraints, can help to enhance bringing about
transformation in policy issues and related processes.
5.3.2.2.1 International organisations
At the highest level, the agents of change include "international organisations" which,
among others, include the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the
Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity. According to Niimberger, their
areas of competence include issues such as "conventions on basic values and their
implementation such as human rights and environmental protection" (ibid.). It is
significant that these issues are regarded as "basic values" and fall under the ambit of
international bodies. On the one hand, this is significant because various forms of
environmental degradation are not confined within geographical borders. Pollutants
emitted in one region affects people in another region. On the other hand, the assumption
here is that these basic values run through different cultures and transcend national and
regional borders. The recognition that issues of human rights and environmental are core
values is in itself ethically significant. However, the main obstacle to promoting these
values is that more weight is given to, for instance, human rights, when the two
mentioned values seem to be in conflict. As previous discussions suggest, the main
problem is that our understanding of reality is purely anthropocentric. Subsequently, what
arises from this anthropocentric approach is the need to satisfy human needs. It seems
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such philosophical principles cannot justify, for instance, environmental protection to
override human utility of the environment (as an expression of human rights).
5.3.2.2.2 The mass media
At another level, Ntirnberger identifies "the mass media" as a sphere where change can
be initiated. Indeed, the mass media has the potential to influence the direction of current
societal issues. In the book Media, Culture and the Environment, Anderson (1997) makes
a thorough discussion about the influence of the media has had in environment-related
issues such as raising environmental awareness and policy-making. For example,
Anderson comments about the recognition made by Greenpeace of "the role of the global
media can play in exerting pressure on the global market" (1997:84-85). According to
Ntirnberger, the sphere of competence of the mass media includes "information, analysis,
exposure of public evils, political advocacy, and the maintenance of the collective value
system" (1999:363). As far as this realm of influence entails, the mass media have the
potential either to reinforce or destroy dominant ideologies in currency. The issues
outlined above are critically important for the discussion in perspective.
As already argued above, on a negative note, the mass media have contributed to the
present environmental degradation through wild advertisement. The market, using the
mass media as a channel, has succeeded in raising curiosity among people about certain
goods and services. One day this good is on the market, the following day it is outdated.
This creates a circular phenomenon which do not only leaves people in a consumption
bondage (in terms of wants), but also lead to the depletion and over-exploitation of
resources, and hence unsustainability. On a positive note, the mass media can use its
influence to deconstruct the fetish that the market unleashes. It can be instrumental to
challenging and exposing ideologies and policies which embody values that are not
socially, politically, ethically and economically acceptable, and impinge on the well-
being of society. Suffice it to say, it is through different channels of information that
people currently have environmental crises. In the same vein, through information
dissemination, the mass media can help to raise people's awareness about
environmentally friendly behaviour. The business news over media should not only be
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about depreciation of Rand, Yen, Dollar and Kwacha. Or, people must not only be
bombarded with statistics on the stock exchange. These dynamics on the market cannot
be divorced from the utility of the environment. In sum, the mass media can be used to
turn the tide by raising ecological consciousness and thereby catalysing ecological
reconstruction.
5.3.2.2.3 The "greens" and other stakeholders
Equally significant for the ecological reconstruction we immensely need, is the role of
"voluntary groups and non-governmental organisations". This category includes activists,
pressure groups, and religious groups. In an effort to raise ecology awareness, names of
environmental groups such as the Earth First! and Green Peace speak volumes with
regard to their overall contribution in "green"-related matters. A classical example is the
significant role local pressure groups of Durban (in conjunction with other international
environmental pressure) in lobbying other role players to expose high levels of pollution
that have caused ailments such as asthma amongst residents in South Durban Industrial
Area.
5.3.2.2.4 Religious communities
Of special importance is the role of religious communities. According to Ntimberger,
their particular sphere of competence is "to cater for the transcendent dimensions of life:
a system of meaning, assurance of one's right of existence, and authority" (1999:363).
Religious communities owe their allegiance to some form of a deity. They affIrm that
every aspect of creation, as an expression of the inherent worth, is unique in its own right.
According to the religious orientation, every aspect of creation derives its worth from its
being independent of human valuation. It is by building on such affirmations that
religious institutions can challenge fallacious ideologies and structures that have favoured
and promoted a narrow understanding of life and advocate laws and policies that promote
the integrity of creation.
Emanating from the framework of a comprehensive reality which religious entities tend
to profess, religious communities have a crucial role to deconstruct the fallacy of
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"economic man" inherent in neo-liberal democracy. Intrinsic in religious belief is the
comprehensive being of reality. Humans are not only economic beings they are also
spiritual beings; "Man shall not live by bread alone". Meaning of life cannot only be
sought in material wealth. This quotation disproves the epistemological presupposition of
a neo-liberal economic theory which elevate material well-being of humanity while
relegating spiritual aspect of life. Human life is not only fulfilled by material needs, and
existence does not only depend on material wealth, but needs to embrace spirituality. The
responsibility that religious communities have in offering "a vision of what ought to be"
(Niirnberger 1999:363) has manifested in religious communities challenging and
exposing social, economic and political structures that are deemed to be in conflict with a
particular vision.
The same can be said about the role of these communities in challenging biased views of
reality. Various forms of environmental degradation in our contemporary times are not
parallel to the biblical quotation "the world is good" in Genesis. Thus, religious
communities need to revisit this quotation and challenge the norms and goals that go
astray from a comprehensive reality of existence. In terms of sustainability, religions
have rich insights as to how humans interact with the environment. For example, though
anthropocentric, the principle of stewardship originated in ancient religions illustrates
moral obligation of human beings towards nature. The message behind this principle is
clear; people are not masters but trustees. This version is opposed to the flawed
interpretation of "stewardship" that implies humanity's dominion over nature. This
truncated understanding inculcates "wanton acts of despoliation or cruelty or over-
exploitation of natural resources" (Connelly and Smith 1999:12-13).
Drawing on the more edifying version of stewardship, international church organisations
such as the WCC need to exert pressure at international level. In sum, religious
communities have the duty of turning what is into what ought to be as the Genesis
quotation cited above suggests. In line with this, international efforts such as the lobby to
Kyoto Protocol need to be intensified and censure arrogance as that shown by
contemporary leaders such as President Bush of the United States of America pertaining
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to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Thatchers and Reagans of the day are obsessed
with economic policies based on neo-liberal economic theory which, as argued above,
undermines the limited capacity of earth resources.
5.3.2.2.5 The nation state
Niirnberger cites a nation state as another agent of change, and its sphere of competence
includes "the rule of law" (1999:363). While this aspect has been discussed in depth
above, the suggestion to be made here is that, by and large, there is need that South
Africa's Constitution and its environmental legislation be imbued with an "Earth
Jurisprudence" content.
Evidently, what emerges from the social ecology oriented models discussed above is the
insight into the dynamics of inclusive reality. As a common feature, they challenge the
traditional perceptions that depict reality in reductionistic, dualistic and mechanistic form.
In their various orientations, they allude to the fact that there is inherent
interconnectedness between different species which ultimately form the whole cosmos. It
follows then that the thread that run through these theories is that a sound ethic is that
which promotes the ultimate good of the whole. In light of sustainability, as opposed to
economic-related paradigms that focus on individual species, these models presuppose
the type of sustainability that takes into account the ultimate well-being of the entire earth
community. It is in light of the understanding of interrelatedness and interconnectedness
that forge the unity that concepts such as biocentric and ecocentric approaches to
environmental ethics are central to such models. This makes sense because what affects a
particular constituent of the "whole" subsequently affects others. Thus, we cannot talk of
the well-being of humans without hinting at the well-being of the environment. This is
exactly the rationale of systems theory which posits that "wholes are more important than
parts to the extent that they cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts" (Cobb 1992:56).
In sum, sustainability should entail promoting a culture of symbiosis between different
entities. The ethical implications of this moral demand is that humans must consciously
and willingly get out of their "self-contained" ego and embrace and enhance the reality of
the existence of relatedness and interdependency. Using the insights of Capra (1992),
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Niimberger's call for a new mindset. One aspect of this new mindset that Niirnberger
advocates is the need for humanity to "develop a vision ofcomprehensive well-being for
the entire system of concentric contexts" (1999:380)(italics original). Niirnberger
expounds:
Inevitable trade-offs have to be built into the vision. Comprehensive well-being,
to be comprehensive, must be optimal, or balanced well-being, rather than
maximised well-being of one part at the expense of other parts. When cancer
cells thrive, they destroy the body on which they feed (1999:380-381).
What is ethically significant in the above articulation of well-being is that it presupposes
inclusive well-being of existence. It provides for an ethic of totality of reality rather than
pieces, individuals and parts of existence.
Evidently, comprehensive well-being in this perspective is premised on qualitative rather
than quantitative terms as the terms "optimal" or "balanced" denote. The dominant
development and economics paradigms embraced in our institutions pervade processes
which run full grain against the world-view of inclusive reality. The gist behind growth-
oriented economies is void of an ethic that regards the environment for its inherent worth.
People continue to rape nature, though in a relatively modified manner. This change has
arisen from the alarming signs and symptoms that threaten human survival. To be again
in touch with the rhythm intrinsic with nature, certainly humans have to readjust in terms
of their interaction with nature. It is high time that legalistic understanding of obligation
(for example duty-based and utilitarian-based) constructuarism be replaced with
transcendental implications of such theories. For example, "[p]olitics and economics [as]
advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has [to be] replaced, in
part, by cooperative mechanisms with an ethical content" (Bell 2001 :27). In the same
vein, the objectives of nature conservation need to be imbued with an "Earth
Jurisprudence ethic" that "necessarily limits some of our individual rights in the best
interests of the rights of the Earth community as a whole" (Bell 2001:26). This will imply
that the notion of "rights" has to be revisited and reinterpreted. For example, Theron-
Nelson advocates that phraseology of a right be replaced with a duty (1999:228), which
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does not necessarily means "derogating from the importance of protecting the
environment" (ibid.). On the contrary, it will mean "introducing a perspective that is
more in line with our moral conceptions, without challenging the basic framework of our
legal institutions" (ibid.). In this sense, as Attfield reasons, this would entail that
the peculiar value of the fulfilment of characteristic human capacities can be
granted without denying the possibility of rights on the part of nonhuman
animals .... Nor can it be necessary for an environmental ethic to be committed
to treating species-boundaries in themselves as a proper basis for discrimination
and differential treatment (1983 :62)(italics original).
5.4 Concluding remarks
It is one of the contentions of this thesis that the intent of environmental law is to protect
and promote values associated with the environment. In other words, the assumption that
informs this thesis is that environmental law embodies varied values that humanity in a
particular society attribute to the environment. Further, it is such values embodied in
environmental law that tend to safeguard and hence promote and that determine how
people tend to interact with the environment. In this thesis, the relationship between
humans and the environment (as an expression of environmental ethics) is discussed in
the light of environmental law that, which supposedly, embodies a certain type of a
constitutional culture. Thus, as Christopher Stone suggests, the nexus between
environmental law and ethics is that: "ethics provides a framework of morality, what
societies collectively decide what they ought to do; while law provides a tool enabling
societies to implement their ethical decision making in practice (cited in Palmer
1997:112). In the context of this thesis, the assumption is that, broadly speaking, "the law
does rest on values endorsed by the majority of those in the country it governs and
provides a tool for the realization and enforcement of such values" (Pa1mer 1997:113).
Hence, "[l]aws should therefore be formulated with reference to their purpose and have a
sound philosophical base. The reasons for regulating human conduct should determine or
at least affect the format and content of the law" (Glavovic 1995:41). Environmental law
can be used as a lever to invoke an "enlightened-self' in citizens which will promote




indigenous jurisprudence, "founded upon a relationship with the planet and other species
provides us with some insights. This relationship is fundamental and extends to the
recognition of rights of other than human species". Hence, "[o]ne task on the agenda of
the ethics of sustainable development is to reconceptualize our inherited moral ideas so
that they can do justice to the full complexity of interactions within and between
biological and social communities" (Engel 1990:19).
5.5 Summary
The discussions In this chapter complement the thesis that suggests that traditional
understanding of reality has handicapped humanity to appreciate that people only
constitute only one part of reality. It is the reductionistic and dualistic interpretation of
reality embodied in different human institutions and systems that has rendered our
environmental policies, and subsequently, sustainability ineffective. The environment is
valued only as a resource which is out there for humanity's gratification. In contemporary
thought, people regard our contemporary ecological crises as a result of mechanistic and
reductionistic views of reality informed by social problem manifested in relations of
dominance and subjugation. It is these trends of thought that suffuse human-nature
relationship resulting in different forms of environmental degradation.
The deficiency inherent in dominant development/economic-related processes and
structures in articulating reality becomes apparent when considering the insights that
emerge from different ecological paradigms discussed in this chapter. This chapter
suggests that the point of departure for regenerating a new ecological wisdom needs to be
compatible with a social ecology paradigm. According to this paradigm, humans need to
perceive themselves as part of the "whole". The contention with regard to social
ecological paradigm is that, only when this inclusive perception of reality is embraced,
that humans need to reconsider their place in the universe. In other words, the
transformation that is needed should illustrate a principle of "ecological citizenship";
humanity's consciousness should be informed by the fact that they have moral obligation
towards other entities by virtue of their intrinsic relatedness to them. In connection to
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this, this thesis suggests that different agents of change have an indispensable role to play





In chapter one I discussed how the concept of sustainable development emerged from an
understanding that environment and development are intrinsically intertwined. The trends
of development prior to 1970s manifested in the ill signs of environmental degradation
and undermined the possibility of meeting human needs in the long term. South Africa
has been cited as an example that has adopted environment/development-related laws and
policies that are meant to promote and achieve sustainable development.
One of the contentions of chapter two is that values are indispensable in human life; they
form part of human life systems. This could be on a personal level or on a contextual
level. In other words, human structures, whether micro or macro, are permeated with
value-judgements. In the context of this thesis, three principles associated with the L
environment have been discussed, viz. instrumental value, intrinsic value and inherent L
worth. In terms of environmental ethics, the first two are anthropocentric in that they I
have to do with human use of the environment. Human consumption of the environment
is an example of instrumental value while aesthetic beauty of the environment is an
aspect of intrinsic value. Unlike these expressions of the environment, the third notion of
value, inherent worth, presupposes the value of the environment independent of its
usefulness to people. The environment is inherently worthy for what it is, regardless of its
human utility.
Chapter two has also discussed three theories of ethics that, by and large, presuppose the
reasons why the environment should be protected. These are: consequence-based and
duty-based approaches, and stewardship. The consequence- based approach takes the
form of Utilitarianism. According to the original form of Utilitarian ethics, actions are
morally acceptable if they bring about maximum happiness for greatest numbers of
people, and vice versa. This chapter suggests that regarding the environment merely for
its instrumental value is a constraint in promoting sustainability. It has also been shown
how environmental principles entrenched in NEMA allude to the fact the environment in
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South Africa is protected for instrumental and intrinsic values. Deontological principles
in environmental ethics such as the Precautionary Principle (PP), the "Polluter Pays"
(PPP) and Duty of Care (Doe) are used as means to safeguard human interests and needs.
People's environmentally unfriendly behaviour, for example pollution, is curtailed
through PPP addressing a human rights demand enshrined in the Bill of Rights of South
Africa's Constitution. It has been argued that these principles also subscribe to the
Utilitarian philosophy. The provision for human rights in South Africa's Constitution has
been cited as an example of deontology in that it entails respect for fellow human beings.
In this way, environmental ethics in South Africa's Constitution and environmental
legislation is anthropocentric. The last traditional moral theory discussed in this chapter is
stewardship. Two versions of this moral philosophy apply. The fIrst portrays humanity as
masters over the rest of creation. This dominance has supposedly contributed to
contemporary environmental degradation. The other version is more environmentally-
oriented. It is endowed with an insight of care: humans are trustees not lords.
Chapter three discussed how the concept of sustainable development was articulated in
different world events. While the insights about the connection between environment and
development emerged in different international events, the currency of the concept of
sustainable development reached its zenith at the Brundtland Commission. Chapter three
has also discussed· how the core principles of sustainable development have influenced
environmental thought in nation states. Special reference has been made as to how South
Africa has embraced the ideals of sustainable development, not only as a response to
international environmental demands, but also to effect change necessitated by the new
political dispensation ushered in during 1994. This chapter showed that South Africa's
environmental legislation and development-related policies embody an environmentally
conscious legislation whose main objective is to promote sustainable development.
Chapter four discussed different approaches to environmental ethics that South Africa's
environmental legislation and economic policies such as GEAR manifest. By using the
concept of the "Discontinuity Problem", the Bill of Rights is critically analysed to
uncover human-centric bias embodied in it. What emerged from this analysis is that
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humans are portrayed as being apart from nature. In this regard, the Bill of Rights is a
typical example of "human jurisprudence" that tends to safeguard human rights and such
that it foregrounds human needs and interests. It has also been shown in this chapter that
this dualistic understanding is reflected in NEMA, IEM, South Africa's Biological Policy
and Conservation, Local Agenda 21 and GEAR. The main argument raised with respect
to these policy-related tools is that all are meant to address human interests and needs as
opposed to environmental concerns. Limited concern for humans as reflected in the
above instruments of legislation undermines the goals of sustainability. With respect to
this, it is human sustainability that is promoted. 'Environmental impact' and concerns are
determined from human perspective.
Issues discussed in the preceding chapter are taken on a higher plane in chapter five
which started with a critique of dualistic interpretation of reality in light of ecological
models. The insights inherent in ecological models discussed environmental schools of
thoughts that philosophically challenge a mechanistic perception of reality. They offer a
conceptual framework that suggests the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of
different entities of cosmos. Subsequently, what this implies in terms of environmental
ethics is an ethic of inclusive concern. This is highlighted in the recognition of the model
of an "Earth Jurisprudence" rather than the dominant human jurisprudence. The
implication of this is that the holistic understanding of reality presumed in an "Earth
Jurisprudence" complements the insights of the ecological models. The central point is
that humanity is only part of the creation. Other entities are as equally worthy as humans.
To this effect, the suggestion put forward is that for sustainability to be real, an all-
encompassing environmental ethic has to be adopted; an ethic that will promote
harmonious interaction between and across entities. However, to achieve this goal, it has
been pointed out that it will take efforts from different sectors at different levels for a
holistic ethic to be achieved and promoted. Special mention has been made of religious
communities because they are attuned to orientations that go beyond narrow formulations
of life and values.
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